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INTRODUCTION1 
A. What is the Wellhead?
A wellhead represents the “surface termination of a wellbore that
incorporates facilities for installing casing hangers during the well
construction phase. The wellhead also incorporates a means of hanging the
production tubing and installing the Christmas tree and surface flow-control
facilities in preparation for the production phase of the well.”2 A “wellbore,”
as referenced above, is defined as the “drilled hole or borehole, including
the openhole or uncased portion of the well.”3 
While a wellhead is sometimes erroneously called a “Christmas tree,”
there is actually a difference between the two installations, albeit
unimportant for present purposes. The “Christmas tree,” installed on top of
the wellhead (and, hence, separate and distinct therefrom), is defined as an
“assembly of equipment, including tubing head adapters, valves, tees,
crosses, top connectors and chokes attached to the uppermost connection of
the tubing head, used to control well production.”4 However, not every well
requires the installation of such a device.
1. This Article is an adaptation of a paper originally presented in New
Orleans, Louisiana, on November 16, 2018, at the 2018 Energy and
Environmental Law Summit sponsored by the Louisiana State Bar Association. It
also draws on material contained in PATRICK S. OTTINGER, LOUISIANA MINERAL
LEASES: A TREATISE (Claitor’s Law Books & Publishing Division, Inc., 2016)
[hereinafter cited as “OTTINGER,MINERAL LEASE TREATISE”], principally by way
of adaptation, reorganization, and supplementation.
2. Wellhead, SCHLUMBERGER OILFIELD GLOSSARY, https://www.glossary
.oilfield.slb.com/Terms/w/wellhead.aspx [https://perma.cc/DQG2-4NWB] (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2019).
3. Id.
4. AM. PETROLEUM INSTI., SPECIFICATION FOR WELLHEAD AND CHRISTMAS
TREE EQUIPMENT § 3.1.27 of API 6A (2010), https://www.api.org/~/media/files/
certification/monogram-apiqr/program-updates/6a-20th-edition-purch-guidelines-r1-
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52019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
B. Relevance of the Wellhead to this Topic
As discussed elsewhere,5 all costs and expenses incurred by the lessee
prior to the opening of the “mouth of the well” are its sole responsibility,
as are the costs and expenses of exploration and production. 
Costs and expenses incurred after minerals are reduced to possession
at the wellhead necessitate a determination—based upon lease language,
codal precepts, court decisions, and the purpose of the process or activity
brought to bear against such raw production—as to whether the lessor’s
royalty share might be permissibly subjected to a portion of the
expenditures incurred “post-production.”6 Thus, the wellhead represents
the point of demarcation between these two regimes of cost-responsibility
and coincides with the precise location, or point in time, envisioned by
article 7 of the Louisiana Mineral Code.7 Article 7 reads, as follows:
Art. 7. When minerals reduced to possession
Minerals are reduced to possession when they are
under physical control that permits delivery to
another.8 
The functional point envisioned by this code article occurs at the wellhead,
but the “mouth of the well” might exist at the exit door of a “Christmas
tree,” if one exists.
As will be demonstrated, a variety of circumstances or occurrences
arise without apparent fanfare at that functional point. These important
events or consequences are the “funny things that happen at the wellhead,”
with which this Article is concerned.
Principal among these circumstances is the issue of “post-production
costs,” sometimes called “marketing costs,” or “post-extraction costs,”9 or 
even (relevant to our topic) “post-wellhead costs.” While many excellent
20120429.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU6L-ZE9L] (last visited Sept. 16, 2019). (URL
broken for purposes of pagination and spacing).
5. See infra Part C.1 of the Introduction. See also OTTINGER, MINERAL
LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(6)(ii).
6. See infra Part C.2 of the Introduction. See also OTTINGER, MINERAL
LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(6)(iii).
7. Act No. 50, 1974 La. Acts Vol. III (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:1– 
31:217 (1975)).
8. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:7 (2018).
9. See David E. Pierce, The Royalty Value Theorem and the Legal Calculus
of Post-Extraction Costs, 23 ENERGY &MIN. L. INST. 159 (2002). 
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6 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
papers have been written on this complex, multi-faceted question, they are,
for the most part, devoted to the consideration of distinct aspects of this
broad topic. It is the objective of this Article to collect an array of
authorities in order to evaluate the entire scope of the topic of “post-
production costs,” and present them in a manner that is hopefully both
comprehensive and informative.
C. Basic Rules on Responsibility for Costs
1. Costs Incurred in Exploration and Establishing Production
Although it does not pertain to the relationship between a lessor and a
lessee under a mineral lease, Section 10 of the Louisiana Conservation
Act10 alludes to the fact that the lessee is responsible for the costs and 
expenses incurred in the “drilling, testing, completing, equipping, and
operating” of the well.11 Hence, the lessee bears all costs and expenses
incurred in the drilling of the well and the establishment of production. 
While it is often said that the lessor’s royalty is “cost-free,” there is
rarely, if ever, any explicit statement in the mineral lease that announces
that the lessee (and not the lessor) bears all costs and expenses of
exploration, production, and development.12 Even the codal definition of
the term “royalty, as used in connection with mineral leases,” makes no
statement about a lessor’s royalty under the mineral lease being free of
costs and expenses.13 
Certainly, in the commercially printed forms of mineral lease
predominately used in Louisiana,14 there is no contrary suggestion that the
lessor has any responsibility for the costs and expenses incurred by the
lessee in establishing production. Indeed, it is well-accepted in the industry
that all costs and expenses incurred in seeking and establishing production
10. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i).
11. While this statute addresses the right of the operator of a compulsory unit
to charge, and the concomitant obligation of a non-operator in such unit to bear,
these costs, the iteration equally describes the range of costs for which the lessee
is personally responsible vis-à-vis its lessor.
12. Of course, this proposition can be contractually altered by the parties
under the doctrine of “freedom of contract.” See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE 
TREATISE, supra note 1, at Chapter Two.
13. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:213(5). See infra Part IV.B.1.
14. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 1-17.
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72019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
are the personal responsibility of the lessee who undertakes such
activities.15 
While the intrinsic nature of royalty is that it is free of cost, one must
consider the types or kinds of costs borne initially by the producer in order
to discern the extent to which there is a limitation on that precept.
Courts, without the benefit of a positive statutory or contractual
statement, often cite to the codal definition of a “mineral royalty” as
support for this well-understood or non-controversial proposition.16 For 
example, in one case,17 the court analogized (but “only in a limited way”)18 
the agreement under judicial scrutiny to a mineral royalty deed, stating that
a “royalty is a right to share in gross production free of drilling or
production costs, but a mineral royalty deed refers to a negotiated
agreement resulting in execution of a mineral lease.”19 
Because a mineral royalty is a distinct mineral right, separate and apart
from a mineral lease (and which, unlike a mineral lease, is subject to the
prescription of nonuse),20 article 80 of the Mineral Code should not
necessarily be relevant to the issue of a mineral lessor’s responsibility vel
non for costs and expenses, except perhaps by way of analogy. 
Beyond mere analogy, the characterization of a mineral royalty
interest as being cost-free under article 80 provides interpretive guidance,
since “[l]aws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference
to each other.”21 
Concerning the royalty under a mineral lease, the court in Merritt v.
Southwestern Electric Power Co.,22 stated that “the royalty is free of all
costs up to [the] point of production, while subsequently incurred costs are
15. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-
25(d)(6)(ii).
16. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:80 (“Unless expressly qualified by the parties, a 
[mineral] royalty is a right to share in gross production free of . . . drilling and
production costs.”). See also PATRICK S. OTTINGER, Mineral Royalties, Louisiana 
Mineral Law Treatise, Ch. 5 (Martin, ed., Claitor’s Law Publishing, 2012).
17. Succession of Lindsey, 477 So. 2d 148 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
18. Id. at 155.
19. Id. In making this statement, the court seemingly misunderstood the
fundamental difference between a mineral royalty and a mineral lease. Being a
charge on the land itself, a mineral royalty can exist without regard to whether a
mineral lease is ever executed. See Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Gary, 70 So. 2d 144
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1954), rev’d on other grounds, 79 So. 2d 869 (La. 1955).
20. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:85(1) (2018).
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13 (2018).
22. 499 So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
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8 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
to be borne on a pro rata basis between operating and non-operating 
interests.”23 
In another case examining the actions of a mineral lessee in assessing
a share of “post-production costs” to the lessor’s royalty share of
production,24 the court noted that “article 80 of the Mineral Code defines
a mineral royalty interest, explaining that ‘unless expressly qualified by
the parties, a royalty is a right to share in gross production free of mining 
or drilling and production costs.’”25 
In the seminal case of Vincent v. Bullock,26 whereby the Louisiana
Supreme Court first characterized the legal nature of the mineral royalty,
the Court cited Professor Harriet Spiller Daggett who, in her important
treatise, said as follows:
The word royalty originated in England where it was used to
designate the share in production reserved by the crown from
those to whom the right to work mines and quarries was granted.
Such is its proper use today in mineral contracts. It is the price 
paid for the privilege of exercising the right to explore. If that right
is granted by a lease contract, it is the whole or part of the
consideration for the lease. If that right is granted or reserved by a
sale, it is the consideration in part or whole of the sale. Royalty in
itself cannot be used to designate the fundamental right which is
being dealt with but only to indicate the percentage, the price, the
rent, the consideration attached to or proceeding out of the right
or that may proceed from it during its existence. The royalty
depends upon the continued existence of the right to which it is an
appendage. It cannot have a life of its own any more than could
interest exist apart from the note or debt to which it is attached. If
a party to a contract sells royalty under an existent lease, he is
selling a part or the whole of his rent due from the lease upon
which his royalty depends. If he sells royalty under an existing
servitude, he is selling a part of the proceeds to issue from the use
of that servitude and the royalty sale is dependent upon the life
and use of the servitude. If a landowner sells royalty, he is selling
the proceeds that may issue from his right to explore for minerals
on his own land, which is an inherent part of his ownership of the
land. If a landowner sells his land and the right to explore inherent
23. Id. at 213.
24. Culpepper v. EOG Res., Inc., 92 So. 3d 1141 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir), writ 
den’d, 98 So. 3d 870 (La. 2012).
25. Id. at 1144 (emphasis by court).
26. 187 So. 35 (La. 1939).
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92019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
in the land and reserves royalty, he is reserving a share in the
anticipated production to result if and when successful exploration
ensues upon the land sold in full ownership.27
Addressing a topic not theretofore examined in great detail, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Vincent v. Bullock provided the following
commentary with respect to the intrinsic nature of “royalty,” to-wit:
It is immaterial what term is used in characterizing the interest
reserved by the plaintiffs, because they have, by clear and
unmistakable language, described the interest reserved by them to
be a full share, free of the cost of production, of 1/16th of the oil,
gas, and other minerals, and a twenty-five cents per ton royalty on
all salt and sulphur, if and when successful exploration is had upon
the land sold to them to defendant F.N. Bullock.28 
Hence, the natural consequence of the fact that the lessor bears no portion
of costs and expenses of “drilling, testing, completing, equipping, and
operating” of the well, is that the lessee necessarily bears all of such costs
and expenses. It is for this reason that the lessee is attributed with the
working interest in the mineral lease (which represents the allocated
responsibility for costs and expenses of exploration, production and 
development),29 and the net revenue interest attributable to such working
interest (which represents the monetary advantage accruing to the owner
of the working interest).30 
2. “Post-production Costs” Incurred Subsequent to the
Establishment of Production
Closely associated with the notion that the lessor bears no portion of
costs and expenses of exploration, production, and development of a well
on the leased premises, is the issue of “post-production costs,” and the
allocation of responsibility therefor. To be sure, the issue of whether, or to
what extent, the lessee is permitted to assess a proportionate share of costs
and expenses incurred in processing or rendering marketable the produced
27. HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA, § 60 (Rev.
Ed. 1949) (emphasis by court).
28. Vincent, 187 So. at 40 (emphasis added).
29. “Working interest” is the “operating interest under an oil and gas lease.
The owner of the working interest has the exclusive right to exploit the minerals 
on the land.” 8 PATRICK H.MARTIN&BRUCEM.KRAMER,WILLIAMS&MEYERS:
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (2018).
30. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 11-03.
337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd  14 1/3/20  7:23 AM
     
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
  
    
  
     
  
  
  
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
  
 
    
     
   
   
   
   
   
  
 
      
   
    
   
  
   
    
    
  
      
          
10 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
oil or gas against the lessor’s royalty is one of the most contentious areas
of litigation involving the mineral lease, both in Louisiana and in other
states.
A tome could certainly be written on the topic of “post-production
costs” but it would soon be somewhat outdated as cases across the nation 
are currently being litigated in a variety of factual contexts. As noted
elsewhere,31 this is an area of the law where a court in one state might take
cognizance of decisions of courts of other energy-producing states on
issues not yet established in the forum state, sometimes concurring, often
disagreeing.32 Thus, while much has been written on this topic, this Article
endeavors to examine these concepts, and to explain them in the context
of the Louisiana mineral lease.
As with other areas of the law involving an intersection between law
and accounting (the law of production in “paying quantities” comes to
mind),33 it is important to first identify certain foundational principles, and
then evaluate how those concepts are applied to the factual situation
envisioned.
D. Objectives and Scope
This Article examines certain fundamental issues pertaining to the role
of the wellhead, and the basic rules of cost-responsibility. These precepts
create a baseline under applicable law. In Part I, various principles are
recognized, noting how relevant rules or laws change “at the wellhead.” It
will be demonstrated that fundamental changes occur at the point of the
wellhead. Important to any consideration of the incurrence of “post-
production costs” is the duty of the lessee (and the right of the operator) to
market production. These matters are taken up in Part II of this Article.
Part III considers the basic legal rules pertaining to the right of the operator
or lessee to assess “post-production costs” in a variety of contexts,
including particularly within the lessor-lessee relationship. At the heart of
31. See infra Part III.C. See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, 
supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(5)(v).
32. Compare Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1337–39 
(La. 1982) (discussing the decisions of the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968), Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613
S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1981), and the Oklahoma Supreme Court case of Tara 
Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981)) with Piney Woods
Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying
Mississippi law which disagrees with Henry).
33. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Production in “Paying Quantities”– A Fresh
Look, 51 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 24 (2004), reprinted in 65 LA.L. REV. 635 (2005).
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112019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
the matter under consideration is the notion of “market value” under an “at
the well” lease. These issues are visited in Part IV of this Article. The
foregoing matters lay the foundation for the topic of “post-production
costs,” including what they are, how they arise, etc. Part V addresses these
issues. The topic of the deductibility of “post-production costs” is
scrutinized in Part VI, including the methodology of determining the
quantum of costs and the touchstones for deductibility. Finally, Part VII
takes up the role of “freedom of contract,” establishing the ability of the
lessor to alter the default rule embodied in the “reconstruction method.”
I. THE WELLHEAD REPRESENTS
THE POINT OF COMMENCEMENT OF THE PRODUCTION PHASE
The critical starting point for the analyses that follow is the
identification of the functional point in time when the lessor’s royalty
interest attaches to production that is obtained by the lessee as a result of
its operations conducted under the mineral lease. At what functional point
does the lessee’s exclusive cost responsibility terminate? This query is
answered by determining when the interest of the lessor attaches, or is
“fixed,” with respect to its royalty share of production.
Funny or not, seven important consequences arise at the point in time
when article 7 comes into play—the wellhead. These consequences or
occurrences are examined seriatim.
A. Law of Immovable Property Yields to Law of Movable Property
The Louisiana Supreme Court has observed that, “with respect to oil
and gas, possession marks both the vesting of title and mobilization.”34 
Thus, it is at the functional point in time—when the oil and gas is
brought to the surface of the earth, and is “reduced to possession” by being
captured or gathered, and otherwise handled—that the product itself
ceases to be a component part of the immovable, which is the earth,35 and 
becomes “movable” property.36 As a consequence, the laws pertinent to
34. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 171 (La. 1992).
35. See Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 92 So. 720 (La. 1922): 
Whilst it is true that “oil and gas, in place, are not subject to absolute 
ownership as specific things apart from the soil of which they form part,”
nevertheless it is equally well settled that the owner of the soil has alone 
the right to sever and appropriate them, which right, of course, he may
cede to another.
36. Southport Petroleum Co. of Del. v. Fithian, 13 So. 2d 382, 383 (La. 1943):
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12 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
immovable property no longer apply to the produced oil and gas, which
upon being reduced to possession, is movable in character.37 
B. Production Reduced to Possession at the Wellhead Actually Co-owned 
by Lessor and Lessee
Secondly, in a mineral lease providing for royalty being due “at the
well,” it is at the wellhead when produced minerals (or entitlement to the
value thereof) come to be owned by the parties in the proportion allocated
respectively to each.38 
Louisiana is an “at the well” state.39 This means that the initial
determination of royalty affixes when the “mouth of the well” (or perhaps
at the downstream “mouth” of the “Christmas tree”) is opened so as to
permit the gas to flow toward a downstream destination. 
In a fictitious sense, the production is divided, at that point, into the
royalty share (based on the fraction specified in the mineral lease), with 
the remaining portion being allocable to the lessee’s interest in
production.40 
It is well settled in this State that there is no title to oil so long as it 
remains in the earth; consequently, no lien could attach to it as the 
property of anyone until it is brought to the surface, and when brought to
the earth, it is clearly no part of the well.
37. De Moss v. Sample, 78 So. 482, 484 (La. 1918) (“The oil and gas, when
reduced to possession by the vendors or their assigns, became the personal
property of the vendors or their assigns.”). Zadeck v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 338 So.
2d 303, 305 (La. App. Ct. 2d Cir. 1976) (“We conclude that gas that has been
reduced to possession is a movable . . . .”).
38. State ex rel. Boykin v. Hope Producing Co., 167 So. 506, 508 (La. App.
Ct. 2d Cir. 1936):
In opposition to this position, defendant plants itself upon the doctrine,
well recognized by our courts, that a gas and/or oil lease . . . only confers
upon the lessee the right and privilege of exploring the land therefor, and
that ownership in the resource produced thereunder vests in the 
proportion stipulated in the lease, that is, that the proportionate
ownership is determined by the fractional parts of the resource, or its
value, to which the parties are entitled.
39. See infra Part IV.E.1 hereof. See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE 
TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(5)(iv)(A).
40. This remaining portion, exclusive of the lessor’s royalty only, is the
“production allocable to the total original right of the lessee to share in production
under the lease,” as contemplated by article 124 of the Louisiana Mineral Code,
defining production in “paying quantities.” Numerically, for present purposes, the
lessee’s share of production is 100% minus the royalty reserved under the mineral 
lease, subject to any existing burdens, if any.
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132019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
C. Royalty Interest of Lessor Attaches to Oil or Gas, as Produced
Thirdly, and importantly for present purposes, at the moment of
production, the royalty attaches to the oil and gas produced at the surface
when such products are captured, or are brought “under physical control,”
at the wellhead. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Wall v. United Gas Public Service
Co.41 cogently stated:
The reason why the division and delivery is made at the well, in
cases where there is to be a division in kind, is that, there is where
the parties come into ownership of the commodity, there is where
title vests. The lessor and lessee are vested with title to the gas at
the well or in the field in the same proportion as the oil is owned.
And while there is to be no division of the gas in kind, it is
nevertheless contemplated that there shall be a ‘division,’ not of
the gas in kind but of its value as fixed by the market price.42 
D. “Market Value” Applied “at the Well[head]”
Next, because the royalty attaches and is “fixed” at the wellhead, the
“market value” “at the well” is applied, or, if there is no value “at the well,”
it is determined through a “net back,” or “reconstruction,” method of
valuation, so as to “reverse determine” the “market value at the well.”43 
E. Role and Application of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 30:10(A)(2)
Ceases “at the Wellhead” With Respect to Certain Costs; “Other Laws” 
Govern Relationship Between Parties to a Compulsory Unit
In an “at the well” state such as Louisiana, in which royalty is “fixed”
and valued at that functional point of production, the royalty is valued after
the incurrence of costs and expenses of “drilling, testing, completing,
equipping, and operating” of the well (for which the lessee alone is
responsible), but prior to the incurrence of “post-production costs,” with
the result that the royalty share bears no portion of costs and expenses of
“drilling, testing, completing, equipping, and operating,” but is potentially
assessed with its proportionate share of “post-production costs.”
41. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934).
42. Id. at 563 (emphasis by court).
43. See infra Part VI.B.
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14 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
This significant conclusion is embraced by a recent federal decision in
a case arising out of the Haynesville Shale in Northwest Louisiana.44 In J. 
Fleet Oil & Gas Corp., L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P.,45 the court
followed a line of well-established caselaw by holding that “post-
production costs” are not “development” or “operation” expenses. 
Therein, the court examined a contractual provision limiting the costs
for which the owner of an overriding royalty interest was not liable, to “all
development, production, and operating expense[s].” The court ultimately
held that “‘development, production, and operation expense[s]’ all refer to
production costs, as opposed to post-production costs. Therefore, since the
provision made no mention of ‘post-production costs,’ the parties did not
intend to exclude them.”46 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:10(A)(2), by its own terms,
only applies to the allocation of the “cost of development and operation of
the pooled unit.”47 That is, the statute provides that “the cost of
development and operation of the pooled unit chargeable to the owners
therein shall be determined and recovered as provided herein.”48 
Certainly, the reference in § 30:10(A) to costs of “operating the well”
continues to have application to costs incurred by the operator after the 
wellhead that are capital in nature, but not to “post-production costs.”
The “as provided herein” refers to the subsections following the 
statute, principally, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i).
Under the court’s rationale in J. Fleet, because Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 30:10(A)(2) makes no mention of marketing or “post-production
costs,” but rather, only concerns “development” and “operation” costs, it
should be presumed that the Legislature did not intend for “post-
production costs” to be regulated by that statute.
44. Kennedy v. Saheid, 209 So. 3d 985, 994 (La. App. Ct. 2d. Cir. 2016), writ 
den’d 215 So. 3d 681 (La. 2017) (“This court would take judicial notice that
March 2008 marked the beginning of the land-leasing boom associated with the
Haynesville Shale formation.” ).
45. No. 15-2461, 2018 WL 1463529 (W.D. La. Mar. 22, 2018). In the interest
of full disclosure, your author represented the defendant in this suit. At this
writing, a motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff is pending before the
court.
46. Id. at *8 (emphasis added). See also Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406,
1416–17 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff’d, 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that
“development . . . and operating expenses” were “costs incident to getting gas to the
surface.”). See also Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v. Hyder, 427 S.W.3d 472, 480 (Tex.
App. 2014), aff’d, 483 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2016) (finding that development . . . and
operation costs . . . are production costs, as opposed to post-production costs.”).
47. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:10(A)(2) (2018).
48. Id. (emphasis added).
337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd  19 1/3/20  7:23 AM
      
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
  
   
   
  
 
  
 
  
      
 
    
  
 
    
 
 
       
       
           
 
  
     
     
    
    
     
     
152019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
The proposition that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:10(A)(2)
does not pertain to the allocation of “post-production costs” is supported
by the underlying nature and purpose of that Section. This section of the
Conservation Act provides a mechanism for the operator to recoup its
expenses in getting the unit well operational, and provides an incentive for
the other working interest owners to participate in the cost, risk, and
expense of doing so.49 It plainly does not apply to the subsequent costs
incurred in marketing and selling the unit production after the point in time
that the oil or gas is “reduced to possession” at the wellhead.
While J. Fleet admittedly arose in a contractual dispute (the court was
called upon to interpret an assignment of overriding royalty, not a statutory
provision), there is no reason why the court’s articulated meaning of
“development” and “operation” would not equally apply to an
understanding and import of those terms as used in Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 30:10(A)(2). This is so because the statute does not define
those precise terms, but, rather, permits the industry meaning of those
terms to apply.50 
F. Responsibility for Severance Taxes Attaches at “Severance”
The Louisiana Constitution authorizes severance taxes to be assessed
against oil, gas, and other natural resources “at the time and place of
severance,”51 and such taxes are imposed by statute.52 These taxes are paid 
by the owner at the time of severance and are payable monthly.53 
Hence, the responsibility for severance taxes attaches at “severance,”
which occurs at the wellhead when the production is “reduced to
possession.”54 Severance taxes are withheld by the operator, and paid to 
the State of Louisiana, regardless of the nature of the interest in the
relevant stream of production.
49. See Patrick S. Ottinger, It’s a Risky Business, but There’s an Act for That:
The Louisiana Risk Fee Act, 63 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 61 (2018).
50. LA. REV. STAT. § 1:3 (2019). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2047 (“Words
of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning when the contract
involves a technical matter.”).
51. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(B).
52. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:631 (2006).
53. Id. § 47:632(A).
54. See Wright v. Imperial Oil & Gas Prods. Co., 148 So. 685 (La. 1933);
Sartor v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 173 So. 103 (La. 1937). See also Cox v.
Cardinal Drilling Co., 188 So. 2d 667 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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16 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
G. Oil and Gas Subject to Security Interest at Severance
As the produced oil and gas is movable (rather than immovable)
property when severed at the wellhead, it suddenly becomes susceptible
of being subjected to a security interest.
With regard to the royalty interest accruing to the lessor, the lessor’s
royalty may be made the subject of a pledge pursuant to Louisiana Civil
Code article 3168 and Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4401.
The share of production allocable to the lessee, typically called its “net
revenue interest” (“NRI”), may not be pledged, but it may be subjected to
a security interest pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code—Secured 
Transactions.55 The precise details pertaining to the creation of this 
security interest on “as-extracted collateral” are beyond the scope of this
Article, but they are discussed in great exposition in Chapter Twelve of
Ottinger, Mineral Law Treatise.56 
II. THE LESSEE’S DUTY TO MARKET57 
A. Basis and Origin of the Lessee’s Duty to Market
Early on, and certainly prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Mineral
Code,58 the duty to market production obtained by the lessee under a
mineral lease was viewed as a responsibility arising out of a lessee’s duty
to act as a “prudent administrator.”59 
Generally, the lessee is held to be under a duty to prudently market the
oil and gas produced, or that which is capable of being produced in
“paying quantities.” Oil usually has a stable market readily available;
however, the marketing of gas at times may be problematic if there are no
pipeline facilities available.
55. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 10:9-101–10:9-809.
56. Supra note 1.
57. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 3-13(e)(4),
for a discussion of the implied duty to prudently market the production.
58. The Louisiana Mineral Code became effective on January 1, 1975.
59. Cf. Simmons v. Pure Oil Co., 124 So. 2d 161, 166 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1960), aff'd, 129 So. 2d 786 (La. 1961) (“Doubtless it is an obligation of the lessee
to operate the lease premises to the mutual advantage of itself and the lessor; and
in a proper case a lessor may maintain an action for dissolution of the contract of
lease against his lessee who has failed to act as a prudent administrator of the lease
premises.”) (first citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2710; and then citing Prince v.
Standard Oil Co. of La., 84 So. 657 (La. 1920)).
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172019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
Hence, the lessee is bound to prudently seek a market for the gas,
notwithstanding the inclusion of a “Shut-in Clause” in the mineral lease.60 
This obligation to act prudently also may attach to the lessee’s selection of
a market. That is, whether the lessee sought a short-term market with a
low price for the gas, or a long-term market with a higher price could also
be scrutinized against the standard of a reasonably prudent operator.
The scope and nature of this marketing responsibility, as recognized
by courts in decisions rendered prior to the adoption of the Louisiana
Mineral Code, are noted in the Comments to Mineral Code article 122, and
are explained as follows:
A mineral lessee is under a duty to exercise reasonable diligence
to secure a market for minerals that have been produced or are
capable of being produced in paying quantities. There is rarely a
problem in this regard where oil is being produced, as ready
markets can usually be found. Most problems arise in connection
with the marketing of gas where the magnitude of reserves has not
been proved, a market is not readily available, marketing facilities
are not available, or administrative delays are involved. The
existence of an obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in
securing a market is recognized in the Louisiana jurisprudence.61 
1. Jurisprudential Authority
In Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co.,62 the lessor filed suit to
secure the dissolution of a mineral lease and sought damages for the
lessees’ alleged failure to produce and market gas. Judgment was rendered
for the lessor, and the lessees appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed.63 
Due to unusual circumstances, the lessees were not able to market the
gas because the well was producing excessive amounts of saltwater. As a
result, the Court found that it “would be wholly uneconomic because it
would necessitate the employment of workmen to have charge of the well
twenty-four hours per day, the installation of expensive equipment
60. See infra Part II.B.1. See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE,
supra note 1, at § 4-13.
61. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122, cmt. (“Diligence in Marketing”). See e.g.
Risinger v. Ark.-La. Gas Co., 3 So. 2d 289 (La. 1941); Hutchinson v. Atlas Oil
Co., 87 So. 2d 265 (La. 1921); Lelong v. Richardson, 126 So. 2d 819 (La. Ct.
App. 2d. Cir. 1961).
62. 3 So. 2d 289 (La. 1941).
63. Id. at 294.
337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd  22 1/3/20  7:23 AM
     
 
 
 
 
  
    
  
    
  
   
  
 
 
 
    
   
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
     
  
 
   
 
   
  
 
 
   
   
   
   
     
    
    
18 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
consisting of large separators and traps, and the building of a pipe line
from the well to the main line about three miles away, all of which would
make the operation of this one well a losing financial proposition.”64 
The lessees were at all times in good faith and exercised due diligence
under the circumstances. The mineral lease provided that the lessee may
make payments to the lessor “until such time as the gas shall be utilized or
sold off the premises.”65 Thus, the mineral lease envisioned that the lessees
need not produce immediately upon discovery of minerals, especially
where the circumstances prevented them from doing so. 
The Court noted that the “purpose of [the ‘Shut-in Clause’] in the lease
was to give the lessees reasonable opportunity to secure the right-of-way 
for the laying of a pipe line and connecting it to the main line, in order that
the gas could be marketed when a market therefor was available.”66 “[I]t
is our opinion that the defendants have not violated the provisions of the 
leases which require due diligence in the operation of this well.”67 
In Hutchinson v. Atlas Oil Co., the next case to take up this issue,68 the 
lessee drilled a well on the leased premises, discovering natural gas. The
mineral lease permitted the lessors to take “sufficient gas for domestic
purposes.”69 When the lessors invoked this provision, the lessee
discontinued production from the well, and took no other action to develop 
the reserves or market the product. The defendant contended that, because
it had to furnish gas to the plaintiffs, this “so exhausted the supply of the
well as to render its further connection with the pipeline impracticable and
unprofitable.”70 
The Court annulled the lease, saying, as follows:
The main object of this and all other mineral leases is to have
exploitation of the premises for their minerals, and, if found, to
have them produced for the common benefit of the lessor and
lessee. . . . Because it is intended, sometimes expressed, but we
think in all cases implied, that the minerals will be produced and
marketed to the best advantage of both parties, especially where,
as in the present case, there is a ready and easily accessible market
for all that can be had.
64. Id. at 291.
65. Id. at 293.
66. Id.
67. Id. 
68. Hutchinson v. Atlas Oil Co., 87 So. 265 (La. 1921).
69. Id. at 268.
70. Id. at 267.
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192019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
In our opinion it would require a very clear and unmistakable 
contract to support the proposition that a lessee could, after
discovering any mineral in paying quantities, decline to explore
further, refuse to pay any further consideration, and fail to market
that which had been found, indefinitely and at his pleasure. Such
a situation would be, to say the least, contrary to the principles of
equity, to say nothing of a wholesome public policy which frowns
upon such putting of property out of commerce.
Then, again, it is clear that in the case of oil and gas a different
rule to that of other minerals, ex necessitate, must apply because
of the peculiar nature of those substances, and of the law
applicable thereto, which enables the owner or lessee of adjoining
tracts to extract all that can be drawn from the earth through his
neighbors. Hence time and prompt development become of the
essence of such contracts, once oil or gas has been found.71 
In another case,72 the lessee drilled and completed a well capable of producing 
gas in “paying quantities,” but the well was shut-in due to the lack of a market.
The lessee paid shut-in royalty payments in accordance with the terms of the
mineral lease. The lessor then sued to dissolve the mineral lease and based his
claim on “the alleged failure of lessees to adequately develop the leased
property under the provisions of the lease agreement, . . . .”73 The court
reinstated the mineral lease, saying that, in its opinion, the “lessees, from
and since the completion of Well No. 1 in November 1957, in good faith
exerted every reasonable and diligent effort in attempting to procure a
market for the gas.”74 
2. Codal Authority
The Louisiana Mineral Code has now codified this general duty in
article 122. That article reads, as follows:
Art. 122. Lessee’s obligation to act as reasonably prudent operator
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor,
but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to
develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent
71. Id. at 270 (citations omitted).
72. Lelong v. Richardson, 126 So. 2d 819 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
73. Id. at 823.
74. Id. at 822.
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20 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties 
may stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on
the part of the lessee.75 
One must note, however, that the marketing duty encompassed by this
article pertains only to the lessor-lessee relationship, and not to other
relationships in the absence of a lease contract.
B. Other Rules Pertaining to the Lessee’s Duty to Market
An array of other principles has evolved in reference to the lessee’s
duty to market the production, such as the following. 
1. The Express “Shut-in Clause” of the Mineral Lease Does not
Dispense With the Lessee’s Implied Duty to Market Diligently76 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in the Risinger decision discussed
earlier,77 held that the lessees had not breached their implied obligation to 
market the product. The fact that the Court did not simply base its decision
on the “Shut-in Clause” in the mineral lease, might lead to the inference
that the Court felt that the express “Shut-in Clause” did not supplant the
implied obligation to market. 
Since the Court did not take the easier and more direct ground to
dispose of the case, the Court impliedly held that the express “Shut-in 
Clause” did not negate the implied obligation to market the produced oil
and gas.78 
2. Scrutinizing the Lessee’s Marketing Activities—No “Second 
Guessing;” No “Hindsight”
The lessor is not entitled to judge the lessee’s conduct in reference to
its marketing responsibilities with the benefit of hindsight. Rather,
reasonableness is judged at the time of the marketing arrangement, without
the benefit of 20-20 hindsight.79 Thus, reasonableness vel non is evaluated
as of the time of execution of the gas sales contract by the lessee. 
75. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 (2018).
76. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: The Louisiana Law of
Shut-in Gas Wells, 69 LA. L. REV. 43 (2008).
77. See supra Part II.A.1.
78. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 2-04(f).
79. Nordan-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp. of Texas v. Miller, 272 F. Supp. 125,
137 (W.D. La. 1967), aff’d 403 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[O]perators are not
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212019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
“It is not the place of courts, or lessors, to examine in hindsight the
business decisions of a gas producer.”80 Citing the leading treatise on oil
and gas law, the court in Nordan-Lawton noted:
There is great risk that close judicial supervision of the lessee’s
conduct in selling gas will inhibit his exercise of his best judgment
to the detriment of both landowner and operator. Scrutiny of
lessee’s actions by judges (or, worse, juries) in the light of after-
acquired knowledge will tend to encourage the operator to take
the least hazardous and perhaps least profitable course of action.
It is unnecessary to impose this conservatism on the operator when
his interest in selling the gas is fully identified with that of his
landowner.81 
As respected commentators have observed:
The combination of substantial deference and the clear and
convincing standard of proof should eliminate frivolous litigation
brought by disgruntled lessors who, with the benefit of hindsight,
are second-guessing a marketing decision made by a lessee. But it
will encourage litigation where evidence of self-dealing or 
conflicts of interests are provable. This strikes a proper balance of
the competing values that are a necessary consequence of the
implied covenant to market.82 
The court in McDowell v. PG&E Resources Co.83 stated “where the
interests of the lessor and the lessee are aligned, as here, the greatest
possible leeway should be extended to the lessee in his decisions about
marketing gas.”84 
held to such an all-knowing standard that is only revealed by ex post facto
judgments.”).
80. Robbins v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 785 P.2d 1010, 1015 (Kan. 1990).
81. 5 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, WILLIAMS & MEYERS:
OIL AND GAS LAW, § 856.3 (1989); see now 5 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M.
KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS: OIL AND GAS LAW, § 856.3 (LexisNexis
Matthew Bender 2015).
82. Bruce M. Kramer & Chris Pearson, The Implied Marketing Covenant in
Oil and Gas Leases: Some Needed Changes for the 80’s, 46 LA. L. REV. 787, 822
(1986).
83. 658 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ den’d 661 So. 2d 1382 (La.
1995).
84. Id. at 784.
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22 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
3. Sales to Affiliates
It is not uncommon to encounter marketing arrangements whereby an
operator contracts with an affiliated company to provide gathering,
transportation, or other midstream services. These transactions are often
dictated by necessity if the affiliate is the only available pipeline or
operator of another necessary facility in the area. Indeed, anecdotal
evidence demonstrates that many of the major operators in the Haynesville
Shale utilize affiliated companies in the marketing of gas production.
Although much could be written on this topic, a few comments are in
order. The issue of the commercial legitimacy of marketing to an affiliate
of the lessee is often inviting of scrutiny. There are valid reasons to enter
a marketing arrangement with an affiliate, but the circumstances
surrounding the undertaking must at all times abide by the lessee’s duty to
prudently market the production.85 
Although no court in Louisiana has so held, courts in Texas have
intimated that the use of a marketing affiliate is not per se impermissible.86 
Indeed, if such arrangements were impermissible under all circumstances, 
courts would have no occasion to examine the factors surrounding the use
of an affiliate, but would merely say that the transaction is not to be
considered in the determination of the lessor’s royalty.
An operator could legitimately use an affiliated company to discharge 
its marketing responsibilities, particularly where the use of the affiliate is
undertaken in a way that does not unreasonably increase costs to the non-
marketing party. In such a case, a non-marketing party who disagrees with
such an affiliated transaction would need to demonstrate the
unreasonableness of the arrangement, and the damages which it allegedly
suffered as a consequence of the affiliate transaction. Louisiana law does
not countenance damages being awarded on a speculative basis.87 
85. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 3-13(e)(4).
86. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 1984), writ 
dism’d as moot, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988). The court cautioned that:
[M]ere fact that a subsidiary is wholly owned by the parent and there is
an identity of management does not justify disregarding the corporate
entity of the subsidiary, but where management and operations are
assimilated to the extent that the subsidiary is simply a name or a conduit 
through which the parent conducts its business, the corporate fiction may 
be disregarded in order to prevent fraud and injustice.
Id. at 28.
87. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Britt, 185 So. 287, 288 (La. 1938) (“Plaintiff,
therefore, has failed to prove his claim for the profits that he would have received
for the lease in controversy with reasonable certainty. We can only rest our
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In an early case, Tyson v. Surf Oil Co.,88 the lessor sued his lessee,
complaining about the lessee’s failure to pay royalties properly. The Court
observed that the lessee produced gas and sold it to its affiliated
companies. The Court noted that “C. M. Leonard was the moving spirit of
all three of defendant affiliated companies, and that he fixed the price of
gas at which [the purchaser] would pay for it.”89 
The Court held that the sale of gas “at one cent per thousand cubic feet
was without the consent of the plaintiffs, [and] the price is not binding on 
plaintiffs and they are entitled to recover a fair market value for the gas at
the well where produced.”90 
In Coyle v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co.,91 the Court approved an
operator selling the full well stream to a subsidiary for gas extraction
purposes that resulted in the operator receiving only one-third (1/3) of the
product and paying royalty on one-third (1/3) of the product. It was shown
by other evidence that the 1/3–2/3 processing fee split was reasonable and
in line with what operators were receiving and paying.92 
4. “Taking in Kind”93 
A lessor under a “sophisticated lease” might wish to reserve the option
to market on its own its royalty share of the oil and gas produced by the
lessee. This is accomplished by including in the mineral lease a “Take in 
Kind Clause.”94 In essence, such a clause affords the lessor an option to
elect to receive a physical share of the gas rather than royalty in money,
thus allowing the lessor to make its own marketing arrangements.
In Tremont Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp.,95 the mineral
lease provided that the lessee “shall deliver to the credit of the [lessor], as
royalty, free of cost, in the pipeline or pipe lines with which the [lessee]
judgment ‘* * * on the basis of certainty, and not on mere conjecture and
speculation.’”).
88. Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336 (La. 1940).
89. Id. at 339.
90. Id.
91. 144 So. 737 (La. 1932).
92. “This charge for extracting the gasoline does not seem to be out of accord
with what is usually, or frequently, charged for that service, as will appear from
quotations from departmental bulletins of the United States, to be found in
Wemple v. Producers’ Oil Co., 145 La. 1031, 1039, 1040, 83 So. 232; . . . .” Id. 
at 743.
93. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 5-15.
94. See id. at § 5-15 (discussing two examples of a “Take in Kind Clause.”).
95. 175 So. 25 (La. 1937).
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24 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
may connect its wells, or in the tanks by the [lessor] provided, at the
[lessor]’s option, the equal one-fourth (1/4) part of all oil produced and
saved from the leased premises,’ etc.”96 
The issue in dispute was “the price or value which the plaintiff, as
lessor, was entitled to; and that depends upon whether the defendant,
lessee, was justified, by the terms of the contracts, in refusing to deliver
the plaintiff’s royalty oil into tank cars furnished by the plaintiff, and in
insisting that the royalty oil should be delivered into tanks to be provided
by the lessor, near the wells.”97 
The district court adopted the lessor’s construction that the lessor had
the right to have the royalty oil delivered into tank cars. “The court
therefore gave judgment for the plaintiff for the market value of the oil.”98 
As authority, the court observed that “[i]t is in cases like this that the
equity spoken of in articles 1964 and 1965 of the Civil Code99— 
announcing the golden rule and the maxim against unjust enrichment— 
serves its purpose.”100 
Sohio Petroleum Co. v. V.S. & P.R.R. is another case involving a
“Take in Kind Clause.”101 In that case, the lessor sued the lessee, 
contending, among other things, that the lessee had not paid royalty on oil
production. The lease expressly provided that the lessor was entitled to
one-eighth (1/8) royalty on oil, “to be delivered at the well in tanks
provided by lessor, or to the credit of lessor into the pipe line to which
wells may be connected.”102 At issue was the consequences arising
because the lessor did not provide the requisite tanks for the receipt of its 
share of oil production.
The Court stated the “plaintiffs having failed to furnish tanks for their
1/8th, [the lessee] literally complied with this provision by delivering the
entire production into the pipelines of [the purchaser]. Such compliance
relieved this company of any further obligation with respect to this
royalty.”103 
96. Id. at 26.
97. Id. at 25.
98. Id. at 25–26.
99. See now LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2054–55. These are set forth in the text
associated with notes 168 and 169, infra.
100. Tremont Lumber Co., 175 So. at 27.
101. 62 So. 2d 615 (La. 1953).
102. Id. at 620.
103. Id. 
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252019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
In Kaufman v. Arnaudville Co., Inc.,104 the lessor sought to dissolve a
mineral lease. Although the decision does not disclose the basis on which
the lessor sought to dissolve the lease, it did reflect that the lessor had
executed a division order, and the trial court held that the execution of that
instrument effectively ratified the mineral lease. In order to pursue his
claim for lease dissolution, the lessor sought to revoke the division order
and relied on language in that instrument. The court further stated, as 
follows:
Counsel for plaintiff also contends that the following language
found in the division order signed by plaintiff allows him to
revoke at his option the instrument of June 7, 1964:
‘* * * until further notice you will give credit for oil, condensate,
and distillate received from the said land, as per directed below.’
This argument is also without merit. The lease signed by plaintiff
provides that the lessor has the right to take his production in kind
if he so desires, provided he furnish tanks for the storing of said
production from the leased property. If no tanks are furnished,
lessee is authorized to sell lessor's oil and pay lessor for same. In
the division order lessor authorized lessee ‘until further notice’ to
take the production, sell it and transmit the proceeds to plaintiff.
The clause ‘until further notice’ has to do only with the optional
method granted to lessee of disposing of the oil received by 
plaintiff under the lease executed by him.105 
When a lessor avails itself of the contractual right to take its share of
production “in kind,” the lessee should be relieved of its implied duty to
prudently market the production. This is because the lessor, not the lessee,
is making marketing decisions and arrangements with regard to its own
share of production.
5. Standard of Care Owed by Marketer
If a contract exists between the marketing party (the lessee or operator)
and an owner of a share of production, that contract will articulate the
standard of care or performance by which the operator’s marketing actions
will be evaluated. If that standard is not expressly stated, the duty to
104. 186 So. 2d 337 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.), cert. den’d 187 So. 2d 739 (La.
1966).
105. Id. at 341.
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26 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
perform the contract in good faith is implied,106 although that
characterization provides little direction in this precise context.
With respect to the mineral lessee who markets production, unless the
lease contract provides otherwise, the performance of the lessee will be
adjudged pursuant to the “reasonable prudent operator standard”
embodied in article 122 of the Mineral Code. Thus, article 122 of the
Mineral Code establishes that the “mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary
obligation to his lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good
faith and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably
prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor.”107 
Article 122 further states that “[p]arties may stipulate what shall
constitute reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.”108 
In case an operating agreement exists, the actions of the operator vis-
à-vis the non-operator are evaluated in accordance with the JOA’s
“Exculpatory Clause.” However, the courts have not been uniform or
consistent in interpreting these clauses as to whether they pertain to only
the operational activities on the ground, or also to administrative duties
such as marketing production.109 
In a case involving a model form JOA (1975 version), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law, took 
up a non-operator’s claim that the operator (Caddo) breached its obligation
under the JOA to provide an accounting.110 
At issue was the standard to be applied to the actions/inactions of
Caddo as operator. The court rejected the non-operator’s contention that
the operator owed it a fiduciary duty, saying:
106. “Contracts must be performed in good faith.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983
(2018).
107. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122.
108. Id.
109. Illustrative of this point are two federal district court decisions reaching
differing results in considering the scope of exculpatory clauses in JOA disputes.
Compare PYR Energy Corp. v. Samson Res. Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 709 (E.D. Tex.
2007) (showing that the court found itself bound to follow Fifth Circuit precedent
set in Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas
law), which held JOA exculpatory language limiting operator liability to
situations of gross negligence of willful misconduct applicable to all good faith
actions undertaken by the operator under the JOA, including performance of its
contractual duties) with Forest Oil Corp. v. Union Oil Co., No. 3:05-CV-0078— 
RRB, 2006 WL 905345 (D. Alaska 2006) (displaying how the court refused to
require a showing of gross negligence or willful misconduct in holding an
operator liable for breach of contract regarding its duties to charge for NORM 
disposal).
110. Caddo Oil Co., Inc. v. O’Brien, 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990).
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272019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
Under the terms of the Operating Agreement, the Operator is
liable to the Owners only in cases of the Operator’s willful
misconduct. The terms of the Operating Agreement control, and
Caddo’s actions are to be judged by a prudent operator standard,
not by that of a fiduciary.111 
A federal district court, the Eastern District of Louisiana, has held that
the marketing party does not owe a fiduciary duty to the other parties.112 
Applying Louisiana law, the court recognized that, when a non-operator
fails to take in kind, the operator has an implicit right to market a non-
operator’s gas, but has no duty to do so. Thus, the court rejected the
plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claims, saying, as follows:
In the absence of a continuing duty to market or purchase
plaintiffs’ gas, plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of agency relationship, mandate, abuse of rights, and
tortious interference with contract fail. The relationship critical to
success on these claims is a relationship giving rise to a duty
toward plaintiffs. However, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate
such a relationship. Amoco acted on its own behalf pursuant to
valid contractual and regulatory authority. Seeking to protect
one’s legal rights in this manner does not constitute an abuse of
rights, unjust enrichment, breach of an agency relationship, or a
breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, absent a duty on the part of
Amoco to market plaintiffs’ gas, Southern can hardly have
induced Amoco to breach that duty.113 
6. Burden of Proof as to Reasonableness of Terms of Marketing 
Production114 
Under Louisiana law, the lessor bears the burden of proving a breach,
or other grounds for dissolution, of a mineral lease.115 With particular
reference to a claim of imprudent marketing of gas production, it has been
held that “[t]he burden of proving that a gas purchase contract was unfair
111. Id. at 18.
112. Tufts v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 87-3015, 1991 WL 61483 (E.D. La.), aff’d
948 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1991).
113. Id. at *7.
114. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 13-06.
115. Cox v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 188 So. 2d 667 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1966);
Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co., Inc., 391 So. 2d 485 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1980);
Webb v. Hardage Corp., 471 So. 2d 889 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Menoah
Petroleum, Inc. v. McKinney, 545 So. 2d 1216 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
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28 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
or unreasonable at the time it was entered into is on the lessor seeking
additional royalty.”116 
“However, the burden is on the plaintiffs to prove market value,
including the reasonableness or unreasonableness of any post-production 
deductions.”117 
7. Prescriptive Period for a Claim of Imprudent Marketing by 
Lessee, or for Assessment of Unauthorized Deductions118 
In pertinent part, article 3494(5) of the Louisiana Civil Code reads as
follows:
Art. 3494. Actions subject to a three-year prescription
The following actions are subject to a liberative
prescription of three years:
* * *
(5) An action to recover underpayments or overpayments
of royalties from the production of minerals, provided that
nothing herein applies to any payments, rent, or royalties
derived from state-owned properties.119 
While this article, as it relates to an action to recover unpaid royalties,
was only codified in 1986, the earlier jurisprudence also applied the
prescription of three (3) years to a claim of improper payment of royalties
under a mineral lease.120 
116. Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 F.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
117. Ramming v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 390 F.3d 366, 374 (5th
Cir. 2004).
118. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 13-42.
119. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3494(5).
120. See Bd. of Comm’rs v. Pure Oil Co., 120 So. 373 (La. 1929). See also
Parker v. Ohio Oil Co., 186 So. 604, 612 (La. 1939) (“[T]he royalties due under
the lease were in the nature of rents and for that reason an action to recover them
was prescribed by three years, as provided in [then] Article 3538 of the Civil
Code.”).
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292019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
In Acadia Holiness Assn. v. IMC Corp.,121 certain mineral lessors sued 
the lessees for improper royalty payments. The lessors contended that the
lessees breached their duty to prudently market the natural gas by entering
into marketing arrangements that incurred allegedly excessive
compression and other costs of production.
The lessors claimed (for prescription purposes) that the basis of their
suit was actually for breach of an implied obligation of the mineral lease
as to which a ten-year prescriptive period applied. Thus, the issue was
whether such claim should be construed as a claim for violation of implied
obligations under a mineral lease for prescription purposes. 
The court of appeal reviewed the pleadings and held that the plaintiffs’
claims were, by their nature, royalty claims, and not simply a breach of
contract claim. Since the measure of damages for the plaintiffs’ claim was
royalty, the court viewed the suit as one for unpaid royalties, as to which
a three-year prescriptive period applied, rather than the ten-year
prescription, which is generally applicable to contractual claims.
To the same effect is Ellender v. GoldKing Production Co.,122 in which
“[p]laintiffs claimed their damage [was] from the breach of the implied
obligation to prudently market and sell the gas produced, although
admittedly measured as the difference in the amount of royalty paid and
the amount of royalty that would have been due if the gas had been
prudently marketed.”123 
In response, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment,
“arguing the three year prescriptive period set forth in La. C.C. art. 3494(5)
governed plaintiffs’ claims.”124 
Relying on Acadia Holiness,125 and other authorities, the appellate 
court affirmed the decision of the trial court in sustaining of the objection
of prescription, limiting plaintiffs’ claim to the period of three years prior
to the filing of suit.
121. 616 So. 2d 855 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.), writ den’d 620 So. 2d 842 (La.
1993). In the interest of full disclosure, the author of this Article represented a
defendant in this case.
122. 775 So. 2d 11 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2000), writ den’d 786 So. 2d 96 (La.
2001).
123. Id. at 14.
124. Id. at 14–15.
125. 616 So. 2d 855 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.), writ den’d 620 So. 2d 842 (La.
1993).
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8. Reconciliation or Retroactive Billing
Issues have arisen as to whether the lessee or operator, after having
paid revenue to another party without deducting a particular “post-
production cost,” can, at a later date (but within the prescriptive period
discussed in the preceding section), charge the account of the lessor or
other party on whose behalf the operator is marketing production, for the
theretofore unbilled expense.
In Merritt v. Southwestern Electric Power Co.,126 the lessee did not
charge against the lessor’s royalty share, any portion of compression costs
for a period of more than five and a half years. The lessee only began doing
so when it “acquired advice from legal counsel in Texas that, under
standard lease provisions similar to those contained in the Lease, a lessor-
royalty owner, as well as a working interest owner, is liable and may be
charged for his proportionate share of compression costs.”127 
One might infer that the right or propriety to charge “post-production
costs” is a matter of law not being held subject to the defense of estoppel
by reason of the lessee’s prior course of conduct (although the decision
does not indicate if that affirmative defense was raised).128
C. Marketing of Production by an Operator on Behalf of Other Owners
The foregoing section dealt with marketing within the lessor-lessee
relationship; outside of that distinct relationship, many operating
agreements recognize the right of a non-operator to take its share of
production in kind and to market its share for its own account. Some
operating agreements continue with the following provision recognizing
the right, but not the duty, of the operator to market production when the
non-operator does not avail of its right to separately market its share of
production, viz.:
126. 499 So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
127. Id. at 212, n.1.
128. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1005.
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312019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
In the event any party shall fail to make the arrangements necessary
to take in kind or separately dispose of its proportionate share of the
oil and gas produced from the Contract Area, Operator shall have
the right, subject to the revocation at will by the party owning it, but
not the obligation, to purchase such oil and gas or sell it to others at
any time and from time to time, for the account of the non-taking
party at the best price obtainable in the area for such production. 
As seen, unless the matter is addressed in a specially negotiated
provision, the operator has no duty to market, but may market, the share
of production not taken or separately marketed by the non-operator.129 
When the non-operator does not market its share of gas production,
and the operator does not exercise its right to do so, issues of gas balancing
are presented. Most operating agreements contain a form of gas balancing
agreement (envisioned to be attached as Exhibit “E” in the model forms)
and that contract regulates the issue of gas imbalances.130 If no such gas
balancing agreement exists, the default law of Louisiana applies.131 
However, this is another topic entirely and is thus beyond the scope of this
Article.
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR OPERATOR’S RIGHT TO ASSESS A SHARE OF
“POST-PRODUCTION COSTS”AGAINST THE INTEREST OF OTHER UNIT 
PARTICIPANTS
A. Relationships in Which the Issue Arises, and Law Applicable Thereto
The issue of whether a party other than the operator might have
responsibility for a share of “post-production costs” arises in a number of
distinct, but not uncommon, contexts.
129. See Aimee Williams Hebert, The Operator’s Duty to Market: The 
Component of Price, 62 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 19-1 (2016).
130. “A gas balancing agreement is an agreement whereby the various owners
of a well, unit, or lease set forth the manner in which production from the well,
unit, or lease will be balanced among the owners in the event that one or more of
the co-owners takes more or less than his allocable share of production from the
well, unit, or lease.” See, e.g., A. Hoppe, Producer Gas Balancing, With and
Without Formal Agreement, 42 ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N, § 2.02[5],
at 2–6 (1991).
131. See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir.)., writ den’d 520 So. 2d 118 (La. 1988).
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32 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
1. Lessor-Lessee Relationship
“A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right
to explore for and produce minerals.”132 Where a mineral lease exists, that
agreement will define the relationship between the parties.
Article 1983 of the Louisiana Civil Code informs that “[c]ontracts 
have the effect of law for the parties.”133 At the same time, contracting
parties are assured that they “are free to contract for any object that is 
lawful, possible, and determined or determinable.”134 
As Louisiana courts have repeatedly noted, “[e]very lease contract
must be governed by its own terms because it is the law between the
parties.”135 “It defines their legal rights and obligations. It must be 
construed as a whole, and so far as possible, effect must be given to all of
its provisions.”136 
Louisiana courts have embraced the proposition that “freedom of
contract” applies to mineral leases.137 For example, in Rebstock v. 
Birthright Oil & Gas Co.,138 it was observed that the “contract between
parties is the law between them and the Courts are obligated to give legal
effect to such contracts according to the true intent of the parties.”139 
By the same token, if an overriding royalty interest has been created140 
and is held by one other than the lessor, the owner of the overriding royalty
interest is a party who might be responsible for paying a share of the “post-
production costs.” Of course, the instrument creating the overriding
132. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:114.
133. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2018).
134. Id. art. 1971. See also LA. REV. STAT. § 31:3 (“Unless expressly or
impliedly prohibited from doing so, individuals may renounce or modify what is
established in their favor by the provisions of this Code if the renunciation or
modification does not affect the rights of others and is not contrary to the public
good.”).
135. Mallett v. Union Oil & Gas Corp. of La., 94 So. 2d 16, 17 (La. 1957).
136. Odom v. Union Producing Co., 141 So. 2d 649, 662 (La. 1962) (on
rehearing).
137. See OTTINGER,MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at Chapter Two.
138. 406 So. 2d 636 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.), writ den’d 407 So. 2d 742 (La.
1981).
139. Id. at 640.
140. An overriding royalty interest is an interest in and to a mineral lease
which entitles the owner thereof to participate in production from or attributable
to such mineral lease, without the payment of costs or expenses associated
therewith. In the industry, an overriding royalty interest is called an “override” or
an “ORRI.” For a comprehensive examination of the ORRI, see Randall S. 
Davidson, The Overriding Royalty, 27 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L 38 (1980).
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332019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
royalty interest will govern the issue, but it is typical that the assignment
of overriding royalty interest might contain a provision commonly called
a “Calculate and Pay Clause,” which, in essence, makes the overriding
royalty interest subject to the same provisions as are contained in the
mineral lease with respect to the lessor’s reserved royalty interest under
the mineral lease.141 
2. Operator and Other Parties, Including Unleased Mineral Owner
or Non-operator
Beyond a mineral lease between the operator and the owner of an
executive interest,142 another participant in a unit operation includes the
owner of a mineral lease covering interests or tracts of land in the unit, in
which the operator owns no interest. Such a party is called a “non-operator.”
Additionally, the owner of land or of a mineral servitude that is not
subject to a mineral lease is an “unleased mineral owner” (“UMO”). A
UMO is an “owner” within the contemplation of the Louisiana Conservation
Act.143 These parties may or may not have a contractual relationship with
the operator, independent of a mineral lease.
a. Contractual Arrangement
One such contract that might exist between the operator and a third party
lessee is a joint operating agreement.144 Such an agreement commonly (but
not always) exists between an operator and a non-operator, the latter being
a lessee under a mineral lease in which the operator may or may not own an
interest. While rare, it is possible that the owner of an unleased mineral
interest might enter into an operating agreement with the operator.
Even if no operating agreement exists, another type of contract that
may exist is a “marketing letter.” This is a simple agreement, usually in
141. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 10-38(f).
142. “A mineral lease may be granted by a person having an executive interest
in the mineral rights on the property leased.” LA. REV. STAT. § 31:116.
143. Id. § 30:3(8) (“‘Owner’ means the person, including operators and
producers acting on behalf of the person, who has or had the right to drill into and
to produce from a pool and to appropriate the production either for himself or for
others.”).
144. An operating agreement is a contract typical to the oil and gas industry
whose function is to designate an “operator, describe the scope of the operator’s
authority, provide for the allocation of costs and production among the parties to
the agreement, and provide for recourse among the parties if one or more default
in their obligations.” 3 ERNEST E. SMITH& JACQUELINE L.WEAVER, TEXAS LAW 
OF OIL AND GAS, § 17.3 at 17-7 (2d ed. 2006).
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34 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
letter format, whereby the non-operator authorizes the operator to sell or
otherwise dispose of the share of production accruing to the non-operator
or UMO.
While there is no talismanic language required for an innominate
contract, such as a marketing letter, one typically encounters language
such as the following, to-wit:
As the Operator of the above mentioned well, Operator proposes
to market your working interest share of gas in the referenced well
under the same terms and conditions as we market our gas.
Operator will perform the following duties on your behalf:
1. Negotiate any gathering, transportation and fuel rates, as
applicable.
2. Sell gas on the sport market on an index-related basis.
3. Nominate and confirm volumes with shippers, gatherers and
pipeline companies.
4. Monitor pipeline imbalances and wellhead imbalances.
5. Pay severance taxes.
6. Verify accuracy of pipeline allocation statements.
Should you elect option (i), Operator will market your oil and/or
gas, and you will receive the same price as Operator-affiliated
working interest owners for production from such well. Operator
may choose to sell to affiliated or unaffiliatedmarketing companies,
pipeline companies, end users or any other purchasers deemed
acceptable in Operator’s sole opinion. Such sales made on your 
behalf shall bear a proportionate share of any post-production
expenses. Some of these expenses may be incurred with affiliates
of Operator. To the extent natural gas liquids or condensate are
extracted from the gas by way of processing, Operator will also 
market those products as well under the terms hereof. Furthermore,
all sales by Operator shall be solely on a reasonable efforts basis
and operator shall have no fiduciary obligation to obtain the best
terms available for the sale of your gas.
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352019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
Regardless of the particular language used by the parties, the terms of the
pertinent contract control the relationship between the parties.
b. No Contractual Arrangement
If none of the types of contracts described above are in place, the
parties are in a relationship governed by the general law of Louisiana.
While these general principles are examined next, it is necessary to first
discuss a case which, at the date of publication of this Article, remains
pending.
In Johnson v. Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P.,145 an unleased mineral
owner contested the right of the operator to assess “post-production costs”
against the revenue of a UMO. The trial court, in reliance on its reading of
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:10(A)(3) as it pertains to the
relationship between the operator and a UMO, granted the plaintiffs’
motion for partial summary judgment, denied defendant’s opposing
motion, and held that “post-production costs cannot be recovered by an
operator from an unleased mineral owner’s share of production
proceeds.”146 This decision of the district court is not final, and the
defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, supported by amici curiae
filings, which remains pending at the date of publication of this Article.
B. Legal Basis for Assessment of a Share of Costs
Although the lessor-lessee relationship is the most common context in
which the issue of deductibility of “post-production costs” might arise,147 
it is, as noted in the previous section, not the exclusive one. The issue is
also presented in the situation where the operator seeks to recoup “post-
production costs” with respect to the interest of an unleased mineral owner
145. No. 5:16-CV-1543, 2019 WL 1301985 (W.D. La. Mar. 21, 2019). In the
interest of full disclosure, the author represents the defendant in this suit.
146. Id. at *5.
147. Jurisprudence on the issue of “post-production costs” dates back to the
infancy of the oil and gas industry in Louisiana. See, e.g., Wemple v. Producers’
Oil Co., 83 So. 232 (La. 1919). In every such early case, the dispute was between
the lessor and the lessee under a mineral lease, and the issue was whether the
lessee properly calculated the lessor’s royalty under that lease. In contrast, the
cases presenting the issue in the context of an unleased mineral owner or other
lessee are quite new, essentially arising because of the significant amount of gas 
discovered in and produced from the Haynesville Shale, first announced in the
spring of 2008.
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or of a non-operator under a mineral lease that covers lands within the unit,
in which the operator owns no interest.
Depending upon the pertinent relationship between the operator and
the interest owner—contractual (including lessor-lessee) or not (absence
of any contract whatsoever)—different theories of law apply to govern the
resolution of the issue.
Within the context of the lessor-lessee relationship, the courts have
applied a method by which market value “at the well” is “reconstructed.”148 
In the absence of a contractual relationship between the operator and 
the UMO and/or a non-operator, the law of unjust enrichment or co-
ownership applies.149 
1. Law of Unjust Enrichment
Louisiana courts have found that each and every other person with an
interest in the unit is responsible for its share of “post-production costs,”
unless expressly agreed otherwise. These groups of people include
working interest owners,150 royalty owners,151 and overriding royalty 
owners.152 
148. See discussion infra Part VI.B. This methodology is examined and
explained in that discussion.
149. The law of unjust enrichment does not apply if a contractual relationship
(such as a mineral lease) exists between the parties. Minyard v. Curtis Products,
Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1968).
150. See, e.g., Merritt v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210, 213
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986) (holding that post-production costs “are to be borne
on a pro rata basis between operating and non-operating interests.”). See alsoWall 
v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561, 564 (La. 1934) (“[T]he lessee cannot
be taxed with the whole cost of marketing the gas.”). These quotations, while 
affirming the proposition that the lessor must bear a proportion of “post-
production costs,” necessarily concede that the costs are first to be borne by the
lessee as the owner of the working interest in the mineral lease.
151. See, e.g.,Magnolia Point Minerals, LLC v. Chesapeake La., LP, No. 11-
00854, 2013 WL 3989579, at *4 (W.D. La. 2013). See also Culpepper v. EOG
Res., Inc., 92 So. 3d 1141, 1144 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir), writ den’d 98 So. 3d 870
(La. 2012). (“Here, there was no provision in the Lease governing the payment of
post-production processing expenses, i.e., transportation costs; therefore, the
Lessors must bear their proportionate share of those expenses.”).
152. See J. Fleet Oil & Gas Corp., L.L.C. v. Chesapeake La., L.P., No. 15-
2461, 2018 WL 1463529 (W.D. La. Mar. 22, 2018) (finding that, because parties
did not expressly agree to exclude “post-production costs,” overriding royalty
owner was responsible for its pro rata share of such costs.). See also Columbine
II Limited P’ship v. Energen Res. Corp., 129 Fed. Appx. 119 (5th Cir. 2005).
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372019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
As noted, the legal basis for the assessment of “post-production costs,”
with regard to a lessor under a mineral lease, is not the doctrine of unjust
enrichment, but rather the application of amethodology to discern “market
value at the well” called the “reconstruction method.”153 
With regard to associations other than the lessor-lessee relationship,
the source of the obligation to pay these particular costs derives from the
principle that “no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and
that no one is allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of
another”—a foundational principle of the civil law.154 
In fact, this maxim “is based on equitable and moral considerations so
fundamental that the legal systems of all civilized societies have
eventually recognized it as a basis for recovery by an unjustly
impoverished party against an unjustly enriched party.”155 
At the risk of redundancy, all discussion herein regarding the remedy
of unjust enrichment has reference (and is directly applicable) to those
circumstances where there exists no contract between the operator and the
third party who owns an interest in production. Hence, the doctrine of
unjust enrichment does not operate with respect to a mineral lease.
With respect to the circumstance where a contract does exist between
such parties but is silent with respect to the issue of “post-production
costs,” and particularly, as to the responsibility of the third party to bear a
portion of such costs and expenses, the provisions of articles 2054 and
2055 of the Louisiana Civil Code invoke the principle of quantum meruit
as a basis of recovery or imposition of costs by the operator.156 
Consistent with the cases addressing the right of an operator to be
reimbursed for monies it expends to obtain the monetary value of oil and
gas in discharging its duty to market the production,157 Louisiana courts 
would rely on the law of unjust enrichment to address the issue of
assessing a share of “post-production costs” to other parties (by either
direct application of that tenet, or by reason of interpretation of a contract
153. See Part VI.B hereof.
154. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2055 (2018).
155. Albert Tate, Jr., The Louisiana Action for Unjustified Enrichment, 50 
TUL. L. REV. 883, 904 (1976).
156. Importantly, Civil Code article 2055 explicitly brings into play the 
“principles that no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and that no
one is allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.” (emphasis
added). See Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d
569 (La. 1989) (discussing the remedy of quantum meruit).
157. See Patrick S. Ottinger, After the Lessee Walks Away–The Rights and
Obligations of the Unleased Mineral Owner in a Producing Unit, 55 ANN. INST.
ON MIN. L. 59 (2008).
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38 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
in which, using the words of article 2054, “the parties made no provision for
a particular situation”).158 The rationale of the case law pertaining to the 
right of the operator to withhold proceeds of production allocable to a non-
participating owner applies equally to the issue of other parties (other than
the mineral lessor) being liable for their share of “post-production costs.”
Thus, the courts have announced the following propositions in these 
cases, among others:
“[The non-participating owner] nevertheless may not enjoy the
profits without participating in the expenses incurred in producing
those profits, since to permit him to do so would violate the moral
maxim of the law that no one ought to enrich himself at the
expense of another.”159 
“Nevertheless, he may not enjoy the profits without participating
in the expenses incurred in producing those profits. To permit him
to do so would violate the moral maxim of the law that no one
ought to enrich himself at the expense of another.”160 
To compel an owner . . . to share the production from their well
with the adjoining unitized owners . . . , without requiring
immediate payment of the latters’ pro rata cost of drilling and
production, but limiting recovery solely from the adjoining
owners’ pro rata of production would, in effect, be unjust
enrichment of the latter and the taking of property of the
producing owner . . . for the gain of the adjoining owners . . .
without adequate compensation . . . . In such case the producing
owner and/or his lessee would be compelled to assume the entire
risk of production, and the financing of the pro rata cost that
should be borne by the non-drilling unitized adjoining owners
and/or lessees.161 
“Recovery of expenses in these circumstances is said to rest on the
158. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2054 (2018).
159. Huckabay v. Texas Co., 78 So. 2d 829, 831 (La. 1955) (emphasis added).
160. Scott v. Hunt Oil Co., 160 So. 2d 433 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ den’d
162 So. 2d 8 (La. 1964) (emphasis added).
161. Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 165 So. 2d 905 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 1964) (emphasis added).
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392019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
principle of unjust enrichment.”162 
Many other cases are in alignment with these authorities and have
been collected in the aforementioned article presented by your author.163 
While it is clear that the law of unjust enrichment is inapplicable where 
a contract exists,164 one arrives at a basis of compensation using quantum
meruit via the application of relevant articles of the Civil Code that address
the interpretation of a contract that makes “no provision for a particular
situation.”
The Comments to article 2054 of the Civil Code state, as follows:
This Article provides for the instance where the contract is not
ambiguous or doubtful, but simply fails to address a particular
question.165 
Under this Article, the court is given the same discretion in the
context of contractual interpretation, since no situation may be
regarded as unregulated by the legal order.166 
There is actually codal authority for this proposition under the following
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code:
Art. 4. Absence of legislation or custom
When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to 
equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and
prevailing usages.167 
Art. 2054. No provision of the parties for a particular situation
When the parties made no provision for a particular situation, it
must be assumed that they intended to bind themselves not only
to the express provisions of the contract, but also to whatever the
law, equity, or usage regards as implied in a contract of that kind
162. Willis v. Int’l Oil & Gas Corp., 541 So. 2d 332, 335 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1989) (emphasis added).
163. See Ottinger, supra note 157.
164. Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1968).
165. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2054, cmt. (b) (2018).
166. Id. cmt. (d).
167. Id. art. 4.
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or necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose.168 
Art. 2055. Equity and usage
Equity, as intended in the preceding articles, is based on the
principles that no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of
another and that no one is allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another.169 
2. Law of Co-Ownership
While these codal authorities and existing case law are more than 
sufficient to support the deductibility of “post-production costs” from the
lessor’s royalty share under an “at the well” lease, another view of the
topic also serves to establish this basic result, if perhaps only by way of
analogy.170 
Although not articulated by any court in the context of “post-
production costs,” Louisiana law subscribes to the “molecular” theory of
the ownership of gas, when and as produced and reduced to possession at
the wellhead. Thus, in Amoco Production Co. v. Thompson,171 it was
stated:
[We] hold that the gas produced from a compulsory unit initially
is owned in indivision and Commissioner Thompson and the trial
judge were correct in applying the “molecular” theory in this
case.172 
The “molecular” theory embraced by the court in Thompson holds that 
“each mineral owner in a compulsory unit is an owner in indivision of each
molecule of gas produced, or, stated another way, each mineral owner in
168. Id. art. 2054.
169. Id. art. 2055.
170. As it pertains to the issue under consideration, the legal analysis that 
follows does not reflect jurisprudential embracement of the conceptual argument
being put forth, probably for the reason that it has never been urged in court. One
might perceive such analysis as being more theoretical in its relevance or
applicability, until a court has had the opportunity to consider such argument.
Hence, this discussion sets forth a view that is an alternative to the traditional
analysis in which courts have engaged in considering the issue of the deductibility
of “post-production costs.”
171. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir.), writ den’d 520 So. 2d 118 (La. 1988).
172. Id. at 387.
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412019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
a compulsory unit owns in indivision his proportionate share of the
minerals in the unit.”173 
Admittedly, the Thompson case was concerned with the power and
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Conservation in reference to the
marketing of natural gas from a compulsory unit, where one party is
overproduced, and another party is correspondingly underproduced.174 
Nevertheless, there is no reason why the “molecular” theory would not
apply in connection with the production of gas from a “lease basis” well.175 
Indeed, as noted in a case concerning severance taxes,176 the Louisiana
Supreme Court observed “under an oil and gas lease contract in which the
lessor reserves a stipulated fractional royalty interest, the parties own the
oil or gas jointly at the time of severance, the lessor owning the fractional
interest reserved as royalty and the lessee owning the remainder . . . .”177 
Thus, at the point in time when the natural gas is “captured” at the
wellhead, it is thereby “reduced to possession.” Concomitantly, the
lessor’s royalty thereby attaches and is “fixed,” under an “at the well”
lease, and at that identified, functional point, the “molecular” theory
operates to render the lessee and the lessor as co-owners of the produced
gas, with the lessee being the manager thereof. 
Produced gas, being movable property, is susceptible of ownership in
indivision as demonstrated by the case of Ellwood Oil Co. v. Anderson.178 
This was an “action between co-owners of production from a gas well that
produced for almost thirty years before it became depleted in 1990, [in
which] the plaintiffs who did not receive their respective percentage share
of production appeal[ed] a judgment sustaining exceptions of no right of
action filed by co-owners who received more than their respective
percentage share of production.”179 
173. Id. at 381.
174. “When one (or more) co-owner(s) of the production from a unit takes 
more than his allocable share of production from the unit, that co-owner is
‘overproduced’ vis-a-vis his co-owners.” “When one (or more) co-owner(s) of the
production from a unit takes less than his allocable share of production from the
unit, that co-owner is ‘underproduced’ vis-a-vis his co-owner(s).” Hunt Oil Co. v.
Batchelor, 644 So. 2d 191, 194, ns.1, 2 (La. 1994).
175. Certainly, when a molecule of gas arrives at the wellhead, it would be a
“funny thing” if it had any awareness that it was or was not unitized.
176. Texas Co. v. Fontenot, 8 So. 2d 689 (La. 1942).
177. Id. at 692.
178. 655 So. 2d 694 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ den’d 661 So. 2d 466 (La.
1995).
179. Id. at 695.
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To resolve the issue, the court relied upon the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership, noting:
Because of the absence of a specific agreement, general principles
of co-ownership are applicable here. It is of no moment that we
agree with the Andersons that partition between co-owners is
inapplicable here because the well is depleted, and nothing is left
to partition. On the other hand, we agree with plaintiffs who seek
to [re]distribute correctly the revenue from the sale of the co-
owned gas production.180 
This regime of co-ownership invokes the full panoply of codal
consequences pertaining to property (whether movable or immovable),
which is owned in indivision. These include the following, to-wit:
Art. 797. Ownership in indivision; definition
Ownership of the same thing by two or more persons is ownership
in indivision. In the absence of other provisions of law or juridical
act, the shares of all co-owners are presumed to be equal.181 
Art. 806. Expenses of maintenance and management
A co-owner who on account of the thing held in indivision has
incurred necessary expenses, expenses for ordinary maintenance
and repairs, or necessary management expenses paid to a third
person, is entitled to reimbursement from the other co-owners in
proportion to their shares.182 
“Necessary expenses” are those that are “incurred for the preservation of
the thing . . . .”183 Perhaps equally pertinent are “useful expenses,” which 
are those that “have enhanced the value of the thing.”184 
Because the mineral lease allocates to the lessee the responsibility to
“manage” the produced oil and gas and to market it in a prudent manner,185 
the lessee, from the point of the gas being “reduced to possession” at the
180. Id. at 697.
181. LA. CIV. CODE art. 797 (2018).
182. Id. art. 806.
183. Id. art. 527.
184. Id. art. 528. However, the comments to article 528 indicate that the 
relevant article in the Civil Code “does not mention recovery for useful expenses 
because of an error in translation.”
185. See supra Part II.
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432019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
wellhead, will incur “necessary expenses,” as well as expenses for
“ordinary maintenance and repairs,” and, in certain cases, “necessary
management expenses paid to a third person.”186 Thus, unless the mineral
lease provides otherwise, the lessee “is entitled to reimbursement from the
other co-owners in proportion to their shares.”187 
3. Provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 30:10(A)(2) Not
Pertinent
As more fully discussed previously,188 the decision in J. Fleet Oil & 
Gas Corp., L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P.,189 would support the
proposition that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:10(A)(2) only 
relates to the allocation of costs incurred in establishing production, and
does not speak to how “post-production costs” should be allocated. Indeed,
the very definition of “wellhead” indicates that it is installed “in 
preparation for the production phase of the well.”190 
A respected commentator observed that “[i]t was early established that
the non-drilling owner was unquestionably entitled to a share of the
production subject to the obligation to pay his part of the drilling,
production, storing, marketing and operating expenses.”191 
C. Relevance of Case Law from Other Jurisdictions192 
Because of the nature of the oil and gas industry, and in recognition of
the fact that there are certain issues, practices and agreements (as well as
operational activities or processing functions), which are common in many
oil and gas producing states, the courts of Louisiana have occasionally
taken cognizance of the published decisions of other states where a 
particular issue has not previously been considered by a court in Louisiana.
As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, “[a]lthough the decisions of
other jurisdictions are not controlling on the Courts of Louisiana, if they
186. LA. CIV. CODE art. 806 (2018).
187. Id.
188. See supra Part I.E.
189. No. 15-2461, 2018 WL 1463529 (W.D. La. Mar. 22, 2018).
190. Wellhead, supra note 2.
191. John M. McCollam, Legal Relations Among Parties to Compulsory 
Units, 15 ANN. INST. ON MIN. LAW 69, 96–97 (1968) (citing Martel v. Jennings-
Heywood Oil Syndicate, 38 So. 253 (La 1905); Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 92 So.
720 (La. 1922); Huckabay v. Texas Co., 78 So. 2d 829 (La. 1955); Scott v. Hunt
Oil Co., 160 So. 2d 433 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ den’d 162 So. 2d 8 (La. 1964)).
192. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 3-03.
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determine an issue practically identical with the one under consideration,
they possess at least a persuasive effect and merit attention.”193 
Another Louisiana court has stated this understandable proposition, as
follows:
Of course, such authorities [from courts of another state] are not
binding on the courts of Louisiana; but as they determine an issue
practically identical with the one in the instant case and constitute
expressions of the highest courts of the named states, they possess
at least a persuasive effect and merit our consideration and a
discussion in this opinion.194 
D. Nature of Liability for “Post-Production Costs”
When an identified cost is properly assessable against the lessor’s
royalty share, it is never a personal, out-of-pocket responsibility. Rather,
because there is no statement in the mineral lease that articulates or
suggests that the lessor should have personal, or “out of pocket,”
responsibility for such costs, it is an in rem liability, payable (if at all)
solely out of the royalty proceeds due and owing to the lessor.195 
In a Kentucky case, the “post-production costs” actually exceeded the
lessor’s royalty share of production, such that the lessor received no 
revenue but the operator billed the lessee for the deficiency, later blaming
the bills on the computer.196 The lessee admitted that the bills would not
be enforced.
193. C H F Fin. Co. v. Jochum, 127 So. 2d 534, 539 (La. 1961).
194. Michiels v. Succession of Gladden, 180 So. 862, 864 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir.), aff’d 183 So. 217 (La. 1938).
195. An in rem liability is one that is dischargeable and payable solely out of
the property burdened by such liability, and does not constitute a personal
obligation for which the debtor is responsible “out of pocket.” Hence, if there is a
deficiency after applying revenue to costs, the obligor is not responsible for any
such shortfall.
196. Cornett v. Magnum Hunter Prod., Inc., No. 13-145-GFVT, 2014 WL
1338708, at *1, *7 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2014):
According to Magnum Hunter, the reason that no royalties were paid is
because, ‘the price of natural gas has declined, such that the post-
production costs described may have exceeded the price of gas Magnum
Hunter has received in some instances,’ which means that ‘after the
Plaintiffs’ one-eighth share of post-production costs is assessed, no
proceeds remain on which royalties can be paid . . . . [T]he Plaintiffs also
petition the Court for a declaration that they do not have to pay the costs
for which Magnum Hunter has billed them. Magnum Hunter responds
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452019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
E. Inapplicability of Well Cost Reporting Statute
Louisiana law is well established that an unleased mineral owner is
not entitled to share in production from a compulsory unit until the 
operator has been reimbursed the costs of drilling, testing, completing,
equipping, and operating the unit well, out of production.197 In industry 
jargon, this point of time is called “pay-out.”
The dilemma of the UMO is that—lacking both the staff and
sophistication of an E&P company—it has no means to ascertain with any
certainty when “pay-out” occurs for this purpose. It is often at the mercy
of the operator in this regard.198 
The Well Cost Reporting Statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes sections
30:103.1, et seq., affords the UMO the opportunity to call upon the
operator to certify as to the amount of costs being recouped, and to thereby 
permit the unleased mineral owner to track the status of “pay-out.”
Should the operator fail to properly and timely report to the UMO, it
would incur the penalty prescribed by Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
30:103.2, reading, as follows:
La. Rev. Stat. § 30:103.2. Failure to report; penalty
Whenever the operator or producer permits ninety calendar days
to elapse from completion of the well and thirty additional
calendar days to elapse from date of receipt of written notice by
certified mail from the owner or owners of unleased oil and gas
interests calling attention to failure to comply with the provisions
of R.S. 30:103.1, such operator or producer shall forfeit his right
to demand contribution from the owner or owners of the unleased
oil and gas interests for the costs of the drilling operations of the
well.199 
However, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:103.1 makes no mention
whatsoever of “post-production costs,” “marketing costs,” or the like. This
statute provides that “operating costs and expenses” are to be reported.200 
It has been recognized that operating costs are costs “incident to getting
that the charges assessed to the Plaintiffs were computer generated and
that the company has no intention of collecting them.
197. See Ottinger, supra note 157.
198. In the jargon of the industry, “E&P” means “exploration and production.”
See LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29(I)(5).
199. Id. § 30:103.2 (emphasis added).
200. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:103.1A(2)(c).
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gas to the surface,”201 where it can be separated and sold by the operator. 
Costs incurred or netted in computing proceeds for the sale of production
once gas is delivered to a gathering pipeline are post-operational or “post-
production expenses,” and not required to be reported (and are not even
mentioned) under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:103.1. 
A word of caution is in order as to the scope or nature of costs that
might be forfeited for a violation of the statute. The court in XXI Oil &
Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co.,202 explained its view of the consequences
of violating the statute, noting “the penalty for ‘costs of the drilling
operations’ includes both pre-production and post-production costs.”203 
IV. “MARKET VALUE”
A. Components to Calculate the Lessor’s Royalty204 
The calculation of the royalty payment to which a lessor is entitled
necessarily takes into consideration an array of components. In the
simplest of terms, the basic formula for calculation of a royalty payment
to a lessor under a mineral lease is, as follows:
201. J. Fleet Oil & Gas Corp., L.L.C. v. Chesapeake La., L.P., No. 15-2461,
2018 WL 1463529, at *15 (W.D. La. Mar. 22, 2018).
202. 206 So. 3d 885 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2016), writ den’d 216 So. 3d 814
(La. 2017). In the interest of full disclosure, this author represented the defendant-
operator in this case to prepare and prosecute a writ application to the Louisiana 
Supreme Court (which was denied) but did not represent the defendant at the trial
or appellate level.
203. Id. at 890. This author believes that the court’s language in stating this
conclusion misused the term “post-production costs,” employing it as referring to
all costs incurred after the wellhead, including capital costs and other costs to
operate the well. While case law suggests that other practitioners share this
author’s belief that the court in XXI “got it wrong,” the federal courts which have
considered this issue feel bound by the Erie doctrine to respect this ruling in the
absence of a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court on the issue of the ambit of
the forfeiture of costs for a violation of the statute. See, e.g., M&N Res. Mgmt.,
LLC v. Exco Operating Co., LP, No. 14-cv-0238, 2017 WL 8809775, *1, *9
(W.D. La. Dec. 13, 2017) (“There was a dissent on this issue [in XXI] (unlike the
issue presented in TDX), but there is no indication in the Erie jurisprudence that
the dissent frees this court to disregard the only state court indicator of how the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana might rule on this issue.”).
204. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Calculating the Lessor’s Royalty Payment: Much
More Than Mere Math, 6 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 1 (2017). See also J. 
Clayton La Grone, Calculating the Landowner’s Royalty, 28 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.
INST. 803 (1982).
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472019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
[Quantity of Product in Units of Product, 
times Price per Unit of Product, 
times Lessor’s Fractional Interest in Minerals, or 1.0, if Entire, 
times Lessor’s Royalty Interest],
minus [Permitted Deductions or Other Withholdings, if any],
times [Lessor’s Unit Participation Interest, or 1.0, if a “Lease Basis”
Well].
While each of these component parts is essential to understand the
methodology of calculating a lessor’s royalty payment, it is necessary to
examine in detail only two enumerated elements, those being components
two and five listed above. The other components are fixed and
determinable and are not subject to interpretation.
B. Definition of Terms
With regard to the second enumerated component in Part IV.A hereof
(“Price per Unit of Product”), although variations obviously exist, a
“Royalty Clause” in a mineral lease typically will take one of two basic
formulations, viz., the monetary price of the royalty is determined either
on the basis of (a) “market value at the well,” or (b) “proceeds received”
by the lessee. It is instructive to consider the meaning of these terms.
1. Royalty205 
The term “royalty” is defined in article 213(5) of the Louisiana
Mineral Code, as follows:
“Royalty,” as used in connection with mineral leases, means any
interest in production, or its value, from or attributable to land
subject to a mineral lease, that is deliverable or payable to the
lessor or others entitled to share therein. Such interests in
production or its value are “royalty,” whether created by the lease
or by separate instrument, if they comprise a part of the negotiated
205. See John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMUL. REV. 223
(1996).
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48 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
agreement resulting in execution of the lease. “Royalty” also
includes sums payable to the lessor that are classified by the lease
as constructive production.206 
As noted, this codal definition pertains to “royalty, as used in
connection with mineral leases.” It does not pertain or apply to a mineral
royalty, properly speaking, which is defined in article 80 of the Louisiana 
Mineral Code.207 
If a mineral royalty is created by the lessor (as landowner) after having
granted a mineral lease (assuming, of course, that the mineral lease is filed
for registry before the subsequent royalty deed), the right of the lessee to
deduct from the mineral royalty a portion of “post-production costs” is
determined by the terms of the superior mineral lease, and would not be
diminished by any attempt in the subsequently created royalty deed to
disallow the lessee from imposing a share of “post-production costs” (or
immunizing the royalty from responsibility for such costs) from the
revenue accruing to the owner of the mineral royalty interest. This
conclusion is both logical as well as concordant with the principle that one
may not grant greater rights than one holds.208 
2. Market Value209 
“In terms of both the dollars at stake and the complexity of the issues
presented, the dispute over the meaning of market value royalty clauses
has no equal in oil and gas law today.”210 
While the premise of that assertion has arguably been somewhat
diminished by subsequent court decisions, the deregulation of the natural
gas market and the evolution of lease forms, still, the fundamental import
of the statement remains viable in the contemporary lessor-lessee
206. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:213(5).
207. “A mineral royalty is the right to participate in production of minerals
from land owned by another or land subject to a mineral servitude owned by
another.” Id. § 31:80. See supra C.1 of the Introduction.
208. See infra Part VI. See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra 
note 1, at § 2-09.
209. See David E. Pierce, The Missing Link in Royalty Analysis: An Essay on
Resolving Value-Based Royalty Disputes, 5 TEX.WESLEYAN L. REV. 185 (1999).
210. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Market Value Royalty Controversy in
Louisiana--The Case for the Lessor, 29 ANN. INST. ON MIN. LAW (1982),
reprinted in 30 ANN. INST. ON MIN. LAW 436 (1983).
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492019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
relationship as a reference to the deductibility vel non of “post-production
costs,” a significant matter discussed elsewhere herein.211 
Courts have frequently used the terms “market value” and “market
price” as though they were interchangeable.212 However, the proper
distinction between the two terms was noted and explained by Professor
Kramer, as follows:
In theory there should be a distinction between the terms market
price and market value. Market price seemingly refers to an actual
sale of the gas in exchange for cash consideration. Thus, without a
sale there is no market price. Market value, however, may exist in
the absence of any actual sale because it is based on a hypothetical
standard. In fact, a number of courts have made this distinction. But
the vast majority of courts have treated market price and market
value royalty clauses as functional equivalents.213 
The difference was also noted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,214 
applying Texas law, where it was stated, as follows:
Market price is the price that is actually paid by buyers for the
same commodity in the same market. It is not necessarily the same
as “market value” or “fair market value” or “reasonable worth.”
Price can only be proved by actual transactions. Value or worth,
which is often resorted to when there is no market price provable,
may be a matter of opinion. There may be wide difference 
between them.215 
211. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(6).
See also Part VI hereof.
212. See Ark. Nat’l Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir. 1935), cert.
den’d 296 U.S. 656 (1936) (“As applied to this case, the term ‘market price’ is
interchangeable with the term ‘market value.’”). Sartor v. United Gas Pub. Serv.
Co., 173 So. 103, 105 (La. 1937) (“Where there is no stipulation to the contrary
in a lease contract of this kind, ‘market value’ is understood to mean the current
market price paid for gas at the well or in the field where it is produced.”). J. M.
Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 107, n.5 (5th Cir. 1966) (“For our purposes
the distinction between market ‘price’ and ‘value’ is of no consequence.”).
213. Bruce M. Kramer, Royalty Interests in the United States: Not Cut from
the Same Cloth, 29 TULSA L.J. 449, 459 (1994).
214. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Coffee, 140 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1944)
(applying Texas law).
215. Id. at 410–11.
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50 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
In Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co.,216 the Court cited several
definitions of the term “market price,” including the following, to-wit:
The term “market price” does not mean an arbitrary price fixed by
the lessee. “Market price” means, according to Webster, “the price
actually given in current market dealings.” (Italics here and
elsewhere ours.)
In Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “market price” is defined as:
The actual price at which a given commodity is currently sold, or
has recently been sold, in the open market, that is, not at forced
sale, but in the usual and ordinary course of trade and competition, 
between sellers and buyers equally free to bargain, as established
by records of late sales.217 
3. “Proceeds” or “Amount Received”
The “Royalty Clause” contained in some forms of mineral leases make
a reference to “proceeds,” or “amount received” (or “amount realized”) by
the lessee.218 Leases of this type are called “proceeds leases.”219 
A “proceeds lease” is defined as a “lease providing for a royalty of a
portion of the proceeds of the sale of oil or gas as distinguished from a
MARKET VALUE LEASE under which the royalty is based on the market
value of the product rather than the proceeds of the sale of the product.”220 
By way of example, the following is provided in Paragraph 7 of the Bath
6 Form, a commercially printed form in popular use in South Louisiana:
The price to be used in computing the market value at the mouth
of the well shall be the price received by Lessee under an arms’
length gas sales contract prudently negotiated in the light of the
facts and circumstances existing at the time of consummation of
such contract; provided, however, should Lessee by virtue of any
order by any regulatory body, state or federal, receive less than the
216. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934).
217. Id. at 563.
218. ¶ 7, Bath 6 Form.
219. “As we understand the case, defendant actually sold the residue gas, and
is accountable for the actual net proceeds only, whether the residue gas was worth
more or less.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir.
1946) (applying Texas law).
220. 8 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS:
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (2018).
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512019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
price provided for in any gas sales contract entered into by Lessee,
such lesser price shall be used in such computation . . . .221 
In the significant case of Frey v. Amoco Production Co.,222 the “Royalty 
Clause” of the lease obligated the lessee to pay to the lessor “royalty on
gas sold by the Lessee of one-fifth (1/5) of the amount realized at the well
from such sales.” Based on that formulation, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that a lessor was entitled to share in monies received by lessee in
settlement of a “take or pay” dispute with its gas purchaser.223 
C. Customary Royalty Provisions in Louisiana Mineral Leases224 
While variations obviously exist, the “Royalty Clause” in the Bath 6
Form, which is in prevalent use in South Louisiana, provides:
Subject to the provisions of Paragraphs 2 and 10 hereof,225 the
royalties to be paid by Lessee are: . . . (b) On gas produced from
or attributable to said land and sold, including the gas remaining
after the extraction of hydrocarbon products therefrom, one-eighth 
(1/8) of the market value at the mouth of the well of the gas so
sold, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substances. 
In the so-called North Form, a commercially printed form in popular use
in North Louisiana, the “Royalty Clause” reads, as follows:
221. Emphasis added.
222. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992).
223. Id. at 178. “Applying Louisiana law to the royalty clause, we conclude,
as did our brothers on the federal bench, the take-or-pay payments made to Amoco
by Columbia in settlement of the take-or-pay litigation form part of the ‘amount
realized’ by Amoco from the sale of gas to Columbia and are therefore subject to
the lessor’s royalty clause in favor of Frey.” 
224. See Earl A. Brown, Royalty Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases: Their Nature,
Construction and Remedies for Breach Thereof, 16th INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX’N 139 (1965); Charles W. McDermott, Fee Oil and Gas Lease Royalty--
Variations and Problems, 28 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 1171 (1982); Owen L.
Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined
Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically? Part I, 37 NAT. RES. J. 547 (1997);
Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations Be 
Determined Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically? Part II, 37 NAT. RES. J.
611 (1997).
225. Under the South Forms, Paragraph 2 is the “Pooling Clause,” and
Paragraph 10 contains the “Proportionate Reduction Clause.” See OTTINGER,
MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at §§ 4-21, 4-30.
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52 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
The royalties to be paid by Lessee are: . . . (b) on gas, including
casinghead gas, or other gaseous substance produced from said
land and sold or used off the premises or for the extraction of
gasoline or other products therefrom, the market value at the well
one-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at
the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized
from such sale, . . . .
D. Jurisprudence Pertaining to the Determination of “Market Value”
The Louisiana Supreme Court was called upon to determine the proper
basis for the ascertainment of the “market value” for royalties on gas under
the “Royalty Clause” of a mineral lease. In Henry v. The Ballard & Cordell
Corp.,226 lessors sued their lessee to dissolve certain mineral leases
because of the alleged failure of the lessee to pay gas royalties on the basis
of “market value.”227 
In 1961, the lessee entered into a long-term gas sales contract and
contended that the price established by that contract is equal to the “market
value” of the gas for purposes of the “Royalty Clause” of the plaintiffs’
leases. 
Counter to the lessee’s position, the lessor contended that “royalties
are to be calculated on the basis of the current market value of the gas, a
value greatly in excess of the 1961 contract price.”228 
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that a mineral lease requiring the
lessee to pay royalties based upon “market value” on gas, contemplated
that the royalties are to be computed on the basis of the price received for
gas under a long-term gas sales contract negotiated in good faith, and not
on the current price obtainable at the time of the actual delivery of gas.229 
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Henry expressly disapproved of the
reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela,230 
which had held that “the contract price for which the gas was sold by the
226. 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
227. See Frederick Scott Kaiser, Henry V. Ballard & Cordell Corp.: Louisiana
Chooses a Point in Time in the Market Value Gas Royalty Controversy, 43 LA. L.
REV. 1257 (1983).
228. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1335 (emphasis by court).
229. Id. at 1341.
230. Id. at 1337–39 (discussing the decisions of the Texas Supreme Court in
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968), Exxon Corp. v.
Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1981), and the Oklahoma Supreme Court
case of Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981)). See 
OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(6)(v).
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532019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
lessee is not necessarily the market price within the meaning of the
lease.”231 
In expressing its disapproval of Vela, the Louisiana Supreme Court
noted that the Texas Supreme Court gave “little or no consideration” to
the “practical and economic necessities of the oil and gas industry at the
time the leases were negotiated.”232 The Court further stated that an 
“ambiguity in royalty provisions such as those at issue in this litigation
cannot be resolved without consideration of the necessary realities of the
oil and gas industry.”233 
The Henry case stands for the proposition that, for purposes of
accounting for gas production, the court should consider the “practical and
economic” realities of the circumstances.234 In particular, the Court placed 
emphasis on the fact that both parties to the mineral lease are on the same
economic footing insofar as royalty accounting is concerned. The Court
stated:
The ultimate objective of the royalty provisions of a lease is to fix
the division between the lessor and lessee of the economic benefits
anticipated from the development of the minerals.235 
* * *
Had plaintiffs shown that the purpose of the market value royalty
clause was to provide them with protection as to price, regardless
of what disposition is made of the gas by lessee and regardless of
what price was received, then we would arrive at a different 
conclusion.236 
The Court further stated that it “did not propose to penalize defendants’
good faith compliance with their lease obligations by requiring them to
pay royalties based on a current, fluctuating, day-to-day market value of
gas several times higher than the price received by them in a sales contract
admittedly in the best interest of both lessors and lessees.”237 
However, the Henry decision was a divided decision: three Justices
subscribed to the majority; three dissented vigorously; and one Justice
231. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
232. Henry, 418 So. 2d 1338.
233. Id. at 1339.
234. Id. at 1338.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1340.
237. Id. 
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54 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
concurred specially with the first three, thus establishing a majority of
Justices. 
The Justices constituting the majority decision expressed frustration
that the plaintiffs did not produce evidence of the parties’ intent so as to
counter the proof presented by the lessees. Thus, the Court noted that
“plaintiffs have given us little help,”238 further explaining that:
In the instant case, only defendants have presented evidence of the
intent of the parties to the mineral lease. All of this evidence
indicates that the parties intended for a past, rather than a current,
market value to control computation of royalties. As did the court
of appeal, we find the Wall case clearly distinguishable on this
basis.239 
The Court distinguished Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co.,240 on the 
basis that “the Wall court was not concerned with whether the current
market price, as opposed to a past market price was to be used in
determining royalty amounts.”241 
In his concurrence, Justice Calogero sought to limit the import of the
Henry decision by stating, as follows:
As I understand the majority opinion, it does not determine that
for all parties to a mineral lease containing the term “market
value” that that term will be interpreted as meaning the price in
the gas sales contract. To the contrary, the determinations made in
the majority opinion are expressly limited to the cases under
consideration.242 
Justice Dennis cogently expressed skepticism about the rationale of the
decision when, in dissent, he stated the following:
I know that my brethren do not think this rule will work an 
injustice in this case, but the precept they announce today will
apply to a diversity of situations in which landowners may be
unable to rectify real injustice because of the evidentiary burden
238. Id. at 1340–41. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1,
at § 1-02, for a discussion, using the Henry case as an example, relative to the
necessity to “build the record.”
239. Id. (emphasis by court).
240. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934).
241. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1340 (emphasis by court).
242. Id. at 1341 (Calogero, J., concurring).
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552019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
it places upon them.243 
Be that as it may, the essential ruling in Henry has never been overruled
or modified by the Louisiana Supreme Court.244 In essence, the holding
stands for the proposition that the amount realized by the lessee for
production sold under a long-term gas sales contract, negotiated and
confected in good faith, will be deemed the “market value” of the gas for
purposes of the “Royalty Clause,” regardless of any differential in price
for the product in the current market.
The following year, the Louisiana Supreme Court again considered
the meaning of “market value” in a “Royalty Clause.” In Shell Oil Co. v.
Williams, Inc.,245 the mineral lessees brought a declaratory judgment
action to validate the basis on which they had paid royalties to their lessor. 
As stated by the Court, the “controversy centers around the market value 
of the federally regulated gas which was irrevocably dedicated by the
lessees to the interstate market.”246 
The lessees entered into long-term gas sales contracts in 1941 and 
1944, pursuant to which the gas was dedicated to the interstate market.
Lessees paid royalties to the lessor on the basis of the price received under
these contracts without complaint. 
However, in the 1970s, the disparity in the price between interstate
and intrastate markets dramatically increased. At that time, the lessor
asserted that the gas royalties that it was receiving were below the “market
value,” as required by the mineral lease.247 
The Supreme Court held that “market value must be determined by
comparable sales in quality which also involve the legal characteristics of 
the gas, that is, whether it is sold on a regulated or unregulated market.
Intrastate and interstate gas are not comparable in quality. They are
conceptually and legally different.”248 
While the import of this decision, as it pertains to the difference
between gas sold in the intrastate market as opposed to the interstate 
market, is admittedly of less continuing significance since the deregulation
243. Id. at 1344 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
244. Indeed, the Henry decision was a central point of authority to the court in
rendering its decision in Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 603 So. 2d 166 (La.
1992).
245. 428 So. 2d 798 (La. 1983).
246. Id. at 799.
247. Id. at 801.
248. Id. at 802.
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56 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
of the gas industry in 1978,249 and the later repeal of wellhead price 
controls in 1993,250 these matters are often addressed by contractual
innovations.
E. Two Approaches to the Issue
There are essentially “two schools of thought” or “two approaches,”
as to how to value the production for purposes of paying royalty to the
lessor under the mineral lease. Courts in oil and gas producing states in
which the issue has been considered, subscribe to either the “at the well”
approach, or to the “marketable condition” view. The former approach
would be considered the majority view on the subject due to the number
of states subscribing to the “at the well” methodology.
1. “At the Well”
Louisiana joins her neighbors, Mississippi and Texas, as an “at the
well” state.251 This connotation has reference to the fact that, under most
“market value” mineral lease forms, as interpreted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the lessor’s royalty share is determined and fixed “at the
well,” or “at the mouth of the well,” as those terms are often encountered
in lease forms.
With respect to gas produced, the royalties are often based upon “the
market value at the mouth of the well of the gas so sold.”252 
249. NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351
(1978).
250. NATURAL GAS WELLHEAD DECONTROL ACT OF 1989, Pub. L. 101-60, 
103 Stat. 157 (1989) (effective Jan. 1, 1993).
251. Other states following the “at the well” rule include: California [Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. State, 262 Cal. Rptr. 683, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)]; Kentucky 
[Reed v. Hackworth, 287 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1956); Baker v. Magnum Hunter Prod.,
Inc., 473 S.W.3d 588 (Ky. 2015)]; Montana [Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 
P.2d 298, 303 (Mt. 1978)]; New Mexico [Creson v. Amoco Prod. Co., 10 P.3d 853
(N.M. App. 2000); Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP America Prod. Co., 407 F.3d 
1091, 1109–10 (10th Cir. 2005)]; and North Dakota [Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C.,
768 N.W. 2d 496 (N.D. 2009)].
252. See ¶ 7, Bath 6 Form, supra Part IV.C; OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE 
TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(b).
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572019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
2. “Marketable Condition”253 
In contradistinction to the rule prevailing in Louisiana that permits the
lessee to assess a proportionate part of “post-production costs” against the
lessor’s share of royalty (unless the lease contract provides otherwise),254 
is the rule called the “marketable condition rule,” or “first market product
rule,” that announces that “post-production costs” remain the
responsibility of the lessee alone.
The premise underlying the rule is that the mineral lessee has an
implied duty to prudently market the production for the mutual benefit of
both the lessor and the lessee. As noted, this is true in Louisiana,255 as well
as most other states.
In those states that subscribe to this principle, the courts consider the
lessee’s duty to market to be so robust and comprehensive as to require
that the lessee, as a component of that marketing responsibility, must
solely incur the costs and expenses necessary to place the oil or gas in a
condition that renders the production into a state or quality that it might be
received by the purchaser or transporter of production.
Once the product is conditioned or treated so as to render it into a
marketable condition, acceptable to the purchaser, costs incurred 
subsequent to that point might, in a proper case, be charged against the
royalty share.
Illustrative of this statement is the case of Garman v. Conoco, Inc.,256 
in which the Colorado Supreme Court took up the following question
certified to it by the federal district court, to-wit:
Under Colorado law, is the owner of an overriding royalty interest
in gas production required to bear a proportionate share of post-
production costs, such as processing, transportation, and
compression, when the assignment creating the overriding royalty
253. See Scott Lansdown, The Marketable Condition Rule, 44 S. TEX. L. REV.
667 (2003). John W. Broomes, Waste Not, Want Not: The Marketable Product
Rule Violates Public Policy Against Waste of Natural Gas Resources, 63 U. KAN.
L. REV. 149 (2014).
254. See infra Part VII.B. See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, 
supra note 1, at §§ 4-25(d)(6), 5-14.
255. Hutchinson v. Atlas Oil Co., 87 So. 265, 270 (La. 1921) (“Because it is
intended, sometimes expressed, but we think in all cases implied, that the minerals
will be produced and marketed to the best advantage of both parties, especially
where, as in the present case, there is a ready and easily accessible market for all
that can be had.”). See supra Part II.A.
256. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
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interest is silent as to how post-production costs are to be borne?257 
After conducting an examination of Colorado law on the subject, the state
supreme court answered the certified question in the negative. The state
supreme court did, however, note a point of demarcation in the rule of
cost-responsibility applicable in a “marketable condition” state, viz.:
Our answer is limited to those post-production costs required to
transform raw gas into a marketable product. As we explained at
the outset, many different types of expenses may be involved in
the conversion process. Upon obtaining a marketable product, any
additional costs incurred to enhance the value of the marketable
gas, . . . , may be charged against nonworking interest owners. To
the extent that certain processing costs enhance the value of an
already marketable product[,] the burden should be placed upon
the lessee to show such costs are reasonable, and that actual
royalty revenues increase in proportion with the costs assessed
against the nonworking interest.258 
Thus, under this rule, the lessee is not permitted to assess against the
lessor’s royalty share any portion of “post-production costs” incurred in
making the product marketable because the duty to market means that all
such costs prior to the ultimate market are really not “post-production
costs.”
Hence, the “marketable condition” rule, which seems to prevail in
Colorado,259 Kansas,260 Oklahoma,261 and West Virginia,262 posits that the
257. Id. at 653.
258. Id. at 660–61 (emphasis in original).
259. Id. at 652.
260. See Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 601 (Kan. 1964); see also
Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995). But see Fawcett v.
Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 352 P.3d 1032, 1042 (Kan. 2015), (clarifying the
rule in which the Kansas Supreme Court held that, “when a lease provides for
royalties based on a share of proceeds from the sale of gas at the well, and the gas
is sold at the well, the operator’s duty to bear the expense of making the gas
marketable does not, as a matter of law, extend beyond that geographical point to
post-sale expenses. In other words, the duty to make gas marketable is satisfied
when the operator delivers the gas to the purchaser in a condition acceptable to
the purchaser in a good faith transaction.”).
261. See Cimarron Utils. Co. v. Safranko, 101 P.2d 258 (Okla. 1940); Wood 
v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals,
Inc., 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998).
262. SeeWellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001); Estate 
of Tawney v. Columbia Nat. Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006).
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592019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
implied covenant to market the product mandates that the lessee is to pay
all “post-production costs” incurred in rendering the gas into a marketable
product. 
Since the “at the well” principle prevails in Louisiana, the “marketable
condition rule” has not been embraced in this state. Accordingly, the
“marketable condition rule” is the antithesis of the rule prevailing in
Louisiana.
V. “POST-PRODUCTION COSTS”
A. Categories of “Post-production Costs”263 
To be sure, the costs and expenses that are typically incurred by the
lessee after the wellhead (being the point of production) are many and
varied. While reasonable persons might disagree as to the assignment of
one or another type of expense to one or the other categories, the courts
have considered the issue of the responsibility of a lessor or other interest
owner in reference to the following particular types of costs and expenses,
to-wit: (a) costs to gather the production; (b) costs to treat or process the 
production; and (c) costs to transport the production to a downstream
market or point of interconnection.
Grouped in this manner for the convenience of discussion, these
particular types of “post-production costs” are taken up seriatim.
B. Gathering Costs
A “gathering system” was characterized by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Sartor v. United Gas Public Service Co.,264 as a system involving 
“the laying of the lines to convey the gas from the wells to the pipelines,”
among other functions or activities.265 
263. See Laura H. Burney, The “Post Production Costs” Issue: Implications
for the Fate of Implied Covenants and Pro-Lessor Clauses in the Shale Era Oil 
and Gas Lease, 63 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 61 (2016); Laura H. Burney, The “Post-
Production Costs” Issue in Texas and Louisiana: Implications for the Fate of 
Implied Covenants and Pro-Lessor Clauses in the Shale Era Oil and Gas Lease, 
48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 599 (2017).
264. 173 So. 103 (La. 1937). For a definition of “gathering” for purposes of
the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:4861–9:4873, see Sea 
Robin Pipeline Co. v. Red Sea Grp., Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 991 (W.D. La. 1996)
(relying on Ben Bolt Gathering Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 323 F.2d 610 (5th
Cir. 1963), a case defining “gathering” for purposes of FERC jurisdiction.). 
265. Sartor, 173 So. at 106.
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The gathering of gas involves the physical taking of possession and
custody of the gas (“gathering,” properly speaking), as well as committing
to deliver minimum quantities of gas to the shipper. 
1. Gathering of Gas266 
The Kansas Supreme Court embraced the calculation of royalties due
to the lessor as the “proceeds from the sale of gas, wherever and however
ultimately sold, [which] is the measure of plaintiffs’ royalty, less
reasonable expenses incurred in its gathering, transporting, processing and 
marketing.”267 
At issue in Dickson v. Sklarco, LLC,268 a case out of the Western
District of Louisiana, was whether the lessee could properly assess, against
the lessor’s royalty share of production, a portion of the costs of gathering
the production. The court, relying on “well-established jurisprudence,”
determined “that transportation and gathering costs are likely deductible
from the lessors’ royalty under the standard provision contained in the
Bath form of the Leases.”269 
However, the court ultimately concluded that a genuine issue of
material fact existed, thus precluding summary judgment with respect to
the meaning of a “No Deductions Clause.”270 
Although it approved the lessee’s assessment of transportation costs,
the court in Wegman v. Central Transmission, Inc.,271 disallowed the 
deductibility of gathering costs. The court’s analysis on this point was as
follows:
We find that these cases distinguishable from the one at bar. In
both cases cited by defendant, the gas was transported out of the
gas fields. Here, the gas was transported a distance of slightly over
one mile to a major pipeline running through the gas field.
266. See Clayton Heare, Effect of Gathering and Processing on Payment of Gas
Royalties and Similar Interests, 10 INST. ON OIL&GAS L. & TAX’N 153 (1959).
267. Matzen v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 321 P.2d 576, 582 (Kan. 1958) (emphasis
added).
268. No. 5:11-cv-00352, 2013 WL 1828051 (W.D. La. 2013).
269. Id. at *6.
270. For further commentary on this case, see OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE 
TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 5-14(c). For a critical analysis of the decision,
questioning the court’s reasoning, see Keith B. Hall, 2014 Survey on Oil and Gas, 
1 TEX. A&ML. REV. 103, 110, n.68 (2015).
271. 499 So. 2d 436 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986), writ den’d 503 So. 2d 478
(La. 1987).
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612019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
* * *
Ample testimony was presented at trial that by industry custom
lessors are not charged for the transportation of gas through small
gathering lines. This is usually considered part of the cost of
operating the well and therefore not charged against the lessor.
Hence, because the use of the gathering system does not constitute
a true “transportation cost” to be charged against the lessors, the 
jury was correct in denying defendant a credit.272 
Wegman should not be viewed as standing for the proposition that, in
a proper case, gathering costs would not constitute “post-production costs”
that might be deducted by the lessee in determining “market value at the
well.” Rather, the appellate court merely affirmed the jury’s factual
determination on the nature of the charges associated with gathering of
gas, finding no error to justify reversal. Professor Patrick H. Martin
explained this point, noting:
The use of CTI’s gathering system did not constitute a true
transportation cost and, thus, the jury was correct in denying
defendant a credit. Market value is a question of fact, and there
was ample evidence to support the jury determination of market
value.273 
2. Minimum Volume Commitment
Its moniker gives it away: A “minimum volume commitment,” or
“MVC,” is a contractual arrangement between the operator or producer
and a midstream company whereby the former agrees and commits to
deliver a specified quantity of oil or gas to and through the system of the
shipper, in exchange for securing more favorable terms on a per unit basis.
The “minimum volume commitment” has been defined and explained
by a commentator as follows:
Minimum volume commitments (MVCs) by the producer are a
common feature of midstream contracts, particularly where the
midstream provider builds a new infrastructure to support any
future development of oil and gas reserves. Under the MVC
structure, the producer commits to delivering certain volumes of
oil, gas or wastewater to the midstream provider at the applicable
contract rate per unit, failing which the producer must make a
272. Id. at 448.
273. Patrick H. Martin, Mineral Rights, 48 LA. L. REV. 387, 409 (1987).
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62 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
shortfall payment based on committed—but undelivered— 
volumes. For the midstream provider, the MVC structure provides
(1) downside protection by setting a floor for the cash flow that it
can expect for the MVC’s duration, and (2) an upside benefit by
incentivizing the producer to drill new wells and increase
production, thereby increasing revenue on delivered volumes.
For the producer, the MVC structure can allow it to lock in more
favorable per-unit rates for midstream services. MVCs can also
serve as the quid pro quo for “firm transportation” service from
the midstream provider, which guarantees the availability of
pipeline capacity for the producer (as opposed to “interruptible”
service, which does not).274 
Although there is no reported decision dealing with the deductibility
of the MVC deficiency fee, such costs can easily be likened to a firm
transportation fee, (discussed hereinafter) and, hence, should be within the
ambit of “gathering costs” for which a lessor or other party on whose
behalf the operator is marketing the production, should reimburse the
operator on a proportional basis. 
C. Treatment or Processing Costs
Reckoning back to the categorization or grouping of the three types of
“post-production costs,”275 the most frequently encountered are the costs
and expenses associated with the treatment or processing of the “raw gas
stream” as it arrives at our “funny” wellhead.
As previously stated, the issue of “post-production costs” most
frequently arises in connection with the production of natural gas, and
arguably less so with liquids. This is because gas must be immediately
delivered by the operator into a pipeline while oil is routinely stored at the
production site prior to being transported to sales. The condition of the
“raw gas stream,” as it exits the well, often makes some form of treatment
or processing of the gas an ineluctable proposition.
There is a subtle distinction between the “treatment” of produced gas,
which typically involves the removal of impurities from the natural gas
stream (such as water, inert gases, and other contaminants that come up
from the earth), and the “processing” of such gas, which involves the
274. Patrick A. Jackson, Do MVC’s in Midstream Contracts Give Rise to
Administrative-Expense Claims in Oil and Gas Cases?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 
(2016).
275. See supra Part V.A.
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632019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
removal of heavier hydrocarbons from the “raw gas stream” (such as
ethane, propane, pentane, hexane, etc.). These “natural gas liquids,” or
“NGLs,” often have economic value and are sold as a distinct value train. 
All production streams have to undergo “treatment” because a pipeline
cannot accept natural gas that contains impurities outside the very
comprehensive, technical specifications for the quality and character of
the natural gas as set forth in “General Terms and Conditions” section of
the pipeline’s tariff.276 
“The processing of natural gas consists of the separation of some of
the components present at the well exit, such as water, acid gases and
heavy hydrocarbons, to adjust the gas to transport or commercial 
specifications . . . . Some natural gas components must be extracted either
for reasons imposed by the subsequent production or transport steps, or to
comply with commercial or regulatory specifications.”277 
“For pipeline transport, the transport specifications are aimed at
preventing the formation of a liquid phase, the clogging of the line by
hydrates, and excessive corrosion.”278 
While most gas undergoes “processing” when it is economical to do
so (since NGLs are more valuable than natural gas in a contemporary price
environment), many pipeline tariffs allow unprocessed gas (i.e., gas
containing heavier hydrocarbons sometimes referred to as “hot gas,” since
its Btu content is higher than normal)279 to be added to the pipeline stream
where that gas can be “blended” with gas from other sources to reduce the
hydrocarbon content back down to normal by the time it reaches the
downstream market destination.
Corrosion can occur from a number of sources, including liquid 
impurities (which is the reason why gas is required to be “treated”), as well
as liquid “fall out” (which occurs when the dew point in the natural gas
stream reaches a temperature that allows the heavier hydrocarbons in the
stream to go from their gaseous state to a liquid state). When liquids are
allowed to collect or pool in a pipeline, corrosion may occur, which may
lead to pitting and metal loss.280 Such metal loss can result in weakening
276. See Policy Statement on Provisions Governing Natural Gas Quality and
Interchangeability in Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Company Tariffs, FERC
Docket No. PL 04-3-000, 115 FERC ¶ 61,325 (June 15, 2006).
277. ALEXANDRE ROJEY ET AL., NATURAL GAS: PRODUCTION PROCESSING 
TRANSPORT § 7.1 (1997).
278. Id.
279. “Btu” stands for British Thermal Unit.
280. “Pitting” is a form of corrosion that would impair or diminish the integrity
of a pipe. “Moreover, corrosion pitting is simply one of many forms of corrosion.
Because ‘corrosion’ is expressly excluded from the definition of ‘accident,’
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64 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
of the pipeline wall, and eventually a breach might occur. There are a
number of methods which pipelines use in order to push out any liquids in
the pipeline, which are all part of a pipeline’s integrity management plan.
The quality control procedures imposed by a pipeline company are called
“specs,” or “specifications,” and in order to meet these “specs,” the
producer incurs costs after the wellhead.
However used, “raw gas” must meet the technical specification in the
pipeline’s tariff before the pipeline will accept the gas for transportation.
Many pipeline meters not only measure the quantity of gas flowing
through a pipeline interconnection, but also the chemical composition of
the gas to ensure compliance with gas quality provisions of the pipeline’s
tariff.
Although this subject matter is certainly of the utmost importance and
would justify a separate, detailed analysis, it is appropriate to identify
some of the issues that have been, or are currently being litigated, while
avoiding the tendency to draw firm conclusions. 
While it is not useful to attempt to articulate all of the types of
functions that might constitute treatment or processing, caselaw has
considered the following remedial activities in an effort to determine if the
lessor has any responsibility for any portion of such expenses, viz.:
(a) Cooling;
(b) Separation of liquids;
(c) Dehydration; and
(d) Sweetening.
Each of these processes is considered in the sections that follow.
1. Cooling
“Cooling” has reference to a process whereby gasoline is extracted
from natural gas. This process was explained in one case, decided a mere
century ago, in the nascent stages of our industry, as follows:
There are two recognized methods of taking gasoline from gas.
Some gases will not yield gasoline without being compressed
under high pressure; other gases will make gasoline simply by
corrosion pitting would likewise be excluded.” Cent. Louisiana Elec. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 579 So. 2d 981, 986 (La. 1991).
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652019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
cooling, without any compression whatever.281 
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Wemple v. Producers’ Oil Co. did 
not permit the lessee to deduct the cooling expenses, finding that “the
additional expense of precipitating the gasoline, by merely passing the
casing-head gas through water cooled coils, being apparently trifling, and
more than compensated by the greater value of the product.”282 
The Court did not directly state that “cooling” costs are not deductible
as a matter of law. Rather, inasmuch as the Court seemingly disallowed
the deduction of “cooling” costs because they were “trifling,” the court
seems to acknowledge that such costs might, in a proper case, be deducted,
if not “trifling.”
Regardless, the deductibility vel non of a “post-production cost”
should not be tethered solely to the magnitude of the cost.
2. Separation of Liquids
At issue in Crichton v. Standard Oil Co. of La.283 was the propriety of
deduction by the lessee of a proportionate part of expenditures necessitated
because the well “produced a gas and gasoline saturate that was worthless
until rendered marketable by the extraction of the gasoline from the
gas.”284 
In reliance on the earlier case of Coyle v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co.,285 
the Crichton Court again reiterated that the lessee is permitted to deduct
such costs of processing which increases the value of the gas, or renders it
marketable, observing:
It is true that in the Cotton Valley field it was problematical
whether a well would come in as a dry hole, as an oil or gas
producer, or as the producer of gas impregnated with gasoline, but
in the absence of a provision in a contract, such as the one sued
upon, relating to the refining and disposal of a product that is
worthless in its natural state, the law steps in and becomes a part
of the contract. This is the underlying principle upon which the
decision in the Coyle Case,286 is based, and, as was said in that
case:
281. Wemple v. Producers’ Oil Co., 83 So. 232 (La. 1919).
282. Id. at 238.
283. 150 So. 668 (La. 1933).
284. Id. 
285. 144 So. 737 (La. 1932).
286. Id.
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‘This we think the law has done by providing, in effect, that the
cost of extraction, incurred by the lessee, to preserve the gas and 
its gasoline content, by making both merchantable, should be
deducted before computing and delivering the lessor’s royalty.’287 
3. Dehydration
Dehydration is necessary to remove water or other liquids from the
“raw gas stream.” Unless removed, the “wet gas” will be highly corrosive,
leading to degradation of the walls of the pipeline. The tariff of the pipeline
company allows the shipper to refuse to receive gas into its system that is
not in conformance with the specifications for the receipt of gas.288 
4. Sweetening
Gas sweetening—sometimes referred to as amine treating—is a 
process that removes hydrogen sulphide (H2S) from the raw gas stream.
H2S is a colorless gas with the characteristic foul odor of rotten eggs, and
is very poisonous, corrosive, and flammable. This process is necessary in
order that the gas no longer has the sour and foul odors of H2S.289 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has
recognized that the “health effects of hydrogen sulfide depend on how
much H2S a worker breathes and for how long. However, many effects are
seen even at low concentrations. Effects range from mild, such as
headaches or eye irritation, to very serious, such as unconsciousness and
death.”290 
D. Transportation Costs
The courts allow the lessee to deduct a proportionate part of the cost
to transport the product from the wellhead (at which functional point gas
is “reduced to possession,” and the royalty interest attaches), to a more
distant point of sale, if there is no market for the sale of gas “at the well.”
Within the ambit of transportation of gas, there are two principal
activities that give rise to expenditures, the sharing of which has been put
287. Crichton, 150 So. at 669.
288. Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561 (La. 1934).
289. Crichton, 150 So. at 668.
290. Hydrogen Sulfide, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/hydrogensulfide/index.html [https://perma.cc/7CU
3-ASS6] (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
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672019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
to issue in the courts. These are the actual movement of the gas in a
downstream direction to a point of sale or other interconnection, and the
arranging of capacity in a pipeline so as to ensure that the lessee will, in
fact, be able to market its production.
1. Moving the Gas
In the seminal case of Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co.,291 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, in determining whether or not a lessor was
entitled to receive royalties based on values derived from a sale made
approximately two miles from the field which resulted in a price of 5.8
cents per thousand cubic feet, or royalties based on a value “at the well,”
decided that the value should be determined “at the well,” despite the fact
that the mineral lease made no provision for determining where “market
price” was to be determined. The Court explained:
Now if the division in kind, where such is contemplated, should
be made at the place where ownership vests, it follows that the
division of the value or proceeds of the gas should be made there,
provided, of course, that the value of the gas can be determined,
and that depends upon whether there is a “market price” for it in
the field.292 
As for the price on the basis of which royalty was to be calculated, the
Court held:
As to the price which the lessee was required to pay the lessor as
a basis of settlement, the contract here involved stipulates that he
should pay one-eighth of the “value of such gas” calculated at the
“market price,” which means the market price at the well or in the
field and not the price which it would bring in a distant market.293 
291. Wall, 152 So. at 564.
The facts in [the Coyle] case are different from those in this case, but the
principle involved is the same in this, that the lessee cannot be taxed with
the whole cost of marketing the gas and extracting therefrom the
gasoline. That, in sum, was the ruling of the trial judge in the present
case. He deducted from the price received by defendant the expense of
piping the gas to the place where it was sold and held that what remained
was the “market price” of the gas.
292. Id. at 563.
293. Id. at 564.
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In a more recent case,294 plaintiffs were successors to the lessors under
a 1985 mineral lease held by the defendant. The plaintiffs’ mineral lease
provided for a royalty on all natural gas produced by defendant, to be
computed “at the mouth of the well.”295 
The mineral lease made reference to an “attached” rider that was not
physically attached to the document when filed into evidence.296 Since it
was not received in evidence, the Court could not consider it.
From the time defendant obtained the lease, defendant had been
producing natural gas from the wells situated on the leased premises. The
cost of transportation of the gas to purchasers had been deducted from
gross revenue in computing the “value at the mouth of the well,” in
determining the royalty due to the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs filed suit seeking an “accounting [of monies owed] . . .
insofar as the transportation deduction is concerned.”297 The trial court
found that the transportation costs were not properly deductible from gross
revenues in computing a lessor’s royalty payment, and that the mineral
lease was ambiguous because the referenced rider was not attached.298 
The appellate court reviewed the issue of whether the mineral lease
was clear regarding whether the language “computed at the mouth of the
well,” contemplated a deduction for transportation costs of the gas from
the well to the purchaser. 299 
The appellate court then discerned that the mineral lease was “clear
and unambiguous,” and that “the computation of a royalty ‘at the well’ has
been long-held by our courts to include deductions for post-production
costs;”300 thus, reversing the trial court’s judgment. 
2. Arranging Pipeline Capacity
Particularly in areas that are lacking in necessary infrastructure
(principally pipelines), and areas that are the site of unconventional
drilling and completion techniques (including hydraulic fracturing), the
ability to move the significant quantity of natural gas that is discovered
and produced is often met with constraints in capacity resulting in
“bottlenecks.”
294. Culpepper v. EOG Res., Inc., 92 So. 3d 1141 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ 
den’d 98 So. 3d 870 (La. 2012).
295. Id. at 1142.
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 1143.
298. Id. at 1142.
299. Id. at 1143.
300. Id.
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692019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
At this writing, there is probably no more active unconventional shale
play than the Permian Basin in West Texas and Northeastern New Mexico.
Both in terms of geographical magnitude, and drilling and production
activity, it is a very significant oil and gas area. Although an old area with 
significant conventional drilling, the arrival of unconventional drilling
techniques, including hydraulic fracturing, has created significant issues
with respect to moving the significant volumes of product to market.
Headlines on a virtually daily basis in The Houston Chronicle, The Wall
Street Journal, and other publications attest to this.301 
The operator-lessee has to make an important decision with respect to
arranging the ability to move that product, such as deciding what type of
301. See, e.g., David. Wethe, Alex Nussbaum, & Ryan Collins, Oil Boom
Bottleneck Costs Permian Investors $1 Billion a Day, BLOOMBERG, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-06/oil-boom-bottlenecks-are-cost
ing-u-s-investors-1-billion-a-day [https://perma.cc/SA9E-Q76N] (last updated
June 7, 2018, 12:45 PM); Javier Blas Shale Giant Says Permian Oil Faces Shut-
ins on Pipe Shortage ENERGYNOW (June 20, 2018), https://energynow.com/2018/
06/shale-giant-says-permian-oil-faces-shut-ins-on-pipe-shortage/ [https://perma.c
c/M4VN-NVHR]; Javier Blas The Biggest U.S. Oil Patch is Near its Limit, 
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-20/shale-giant-
says-permian-oil-faces-shut-ins-on-pipeline-shortage [https://perma.cc/MW67-LN
CF] (last updated June 20, 2018 5:03 AM); Ryan Collins, Unfracked Oil Wells
Growing as Permian Pipeline Scarcity Worsens ENERGYNOW (June 21, 2018),
https://energynow.com/2018/06/unfracked-oil-wells-growing-as-permian-pipeline
-scarcity-worsens/ [https://perma.cc/C6WX-PMDW]; Gas Bottleneck in Permian 
Widens Price Differential OIL & GAS 360 (July 18, 2018), https://www.oiland
gas360.com/gas-bottleneck-in-permian-widens-price-differential/ [https://perma.cc
/UQH6-DESG]; Rebecca Elliott, Bigger Oil Pipelines Are Coming to West Texas
to Ease Bottleneck WALL STREET J. (July 30, 2018 5:30), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/bigger-oil-pipelines-are-coming-to-west-texas-to-ease-bottleneck-153294
3030 [https://perma.cc/5FW3-NVJ5]; Rebecca Elliott, In America’s Hottest
Drilling Spot, Gas is Going up in SmokeWALL STREET J. (Aug. 29, 2018, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-americas-hottest-drilling-spot-vast-volumes-of-
gas-go-up-in-smoke-1535535001 [https://perma.cc/ZK95-8T4F]; Rye Druzin,
Report: Pipeline Constraints Could Curtail $1.4 Billion in Permian Completions
CHRON, https://www.chron.com/business/article/Report-Pipeline-constraints-
could-curtail-1-4-13193678.php [https://perma.cc/4TKS-QGNX] (last updated
on Aug. 31, 2018); Rye Druzin, West Texas’ Permian Losing Luster as
Companies Look Elsewhere CHRON, https://www.chron.com/business/energy/art
icle/West-Texas-Permian-losing-luster-as-companies-13244072.php [https://per
ma.cc/2XGX-M6ML] (last updated on Sept. 20, 2018, 10:20 AM); Rebecca
Elliott, In Booming Oilfield, Natural Gas Can be FreeWALL STREET J. (Dec. 27,
2018 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-booming-oilfield-natural-gas-
can-be-free-11545906601 [https://perma.cc/Q4SX-HYU3].
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70 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
arrangement is the most prudent under the circumstances then prevailing.
An operator who markets production will customarily contract for pipeline
capacity in one of two formats, next identified.
a. Firm Service
As the name suggests, a producer who arranges firm service is assured
guaranteed capacity on the pipeline up to the amount contracted by the
producer. Generally, producers entitled to firm service make a required
periodic payment for this reserved capacity (a minimum volume delivery
commitment). 
Service under this arrangement may not be interrupted except under
certain specified circumstances (for example, maintenance of the pipeline,
or force majeure). 
Although it did not involve Louisiana substantive law, the District of
Columbia Circuit court took up the issue of deductibility of certain costs
in connection with production secured under federal leases under the
regulatory auspices of the Department of Interior.302 
Federal leases are governed, in large part, by federal regulations,
which, as noted by the court, allow “two deductions from gross proceeds
when calculating value for royalty purposes,” one which “relates to certain
processing costs . . . ; the other is for transportation costs when production
is sold at a market away from the lease.”303 
The D.C. Circuit upheld the permissibility of deducting “unused firm
demand charges.”304 These represent an “upfront reservation fee,” that
“secure[s] a guaranteed amount of continuously available pipeline
capacity.”305 
Elucidating on its decision, the court noted:
On its face, it is hard to see how money paid for assurance of
secure transportation is not “for transportation”; the cost of freight
insurance looks like a shipping expense, for example, even if the
goods arrive without difficulty and the premium therefore goes 
“unused.”306 
302. Independent Petroleum Ass’n of Am. v. DeWitt, 279 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
303. Id. at 1037.
304. Id. at 1042.
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd  75 1/3/20  7:23 AM
      
 
 
 
 
    
     
   
  
   
   
 
  
  
   
  
  
  
 
     
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
      
   
   
    
   
  
    
     
   
712019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
The deductibility of firm transportation fees from the share of the
lessor was taken up in the case of Commissioner of the General Land
Office of the State of Texas v. SandRidge Energy, Inc.307 The Texas
appellate court first noted that the “issue is not whether firm transportation
charges qualify generally as transportation costs. They clearly do.”308 
Instead, the court stated that the issue was whether “firm
transportation charges must be, per the terms of these particular leases,
actually incurred from sales of gas produced from the Green and Purple
Leases before they are properly deductible from royalties paid under those
leases.”309 The court concluded “that they must.”310 Notably, the 
SandRidge case was based on the particular language of the leases
involved and does not announce a broader proposition as to the
deductibility of firm transportation costs in general.
A relevant decision regarding the propriety of deducting firm transport
fees is the Wyoming State Board of Equalization’s decision in In the
Matter of the Appeal of WPX Energy, Inc.311 WPX involved an appeal by
a producer who challenged the Wyoming Revenue Department’s decision
to disallow the deduction of firm transport fees when reporting taxable
value and paying mineral taxes.312 
On appeal, the State Board of Equalization framed the issue as 
“whether WPX was entitled by statute to deduct the entire pipeline demand
charge/reservation fee incurred for capacity on a pipeline when WPX used
less than its entire reserved pipeline capacity.”313 
Ultimately, the Board reversed the Department, finding that “WPX
was entitled to deduct the entire demand charge as a transportation expense
under the statutory netback method.”314 In reaching this decision, the
Board found:
WPX incurred the additional demand charge to not only transport
its production, but more particularly to secure pipeline access
priority relative to other producers or shippers of gas, regardless
of market conditions . . . . Further, the evidence demonstrated 
307. 454 S.W.3d 603, 622 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2014, pet. abated).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. (emphasis added).
311. In re Matter of WPX Energy, Inc. From a Decision of the Department of
Revenue (Min. Gross Products, Production Year 2012), Docket No. 2016-31, 
2017 WL 6276019 (Wyo. St. Bd. Eq. 2017).
312. Id. at *1.
313. Id. at *2.
314. Id. at *1.
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72 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
WPX paid the entire demand charge for each and every unit
(mcd/mmbtu) of gas, ensuring that no matter the market
conditions or competing interests, each unit of its gas production
would ship and reach the desired market.315 
b. Interruptible Service
In contrast to firm service, interruptible service assures the producer
with no particular or designated capacity on the pipeline that can be 
considered as guaranteed. Consequently, access to the pipeline may be
interrupted or suspended at any time for any reason (for example, capacity
constraints). 
For this reason, the fees paid by the lessee to the pipeline company
under an interruptible service arrangement are typically lower than under
a firm service arrangement. The pipeline company might provide different
service levels to a given producer under a given gas gathering or purchase
agreement (for example, firm service up to a minimum committed volume,
and interruptible service in excess of that volume). 
3. Compression
“Compression is merely a function of increasing the pressure in the
natural gas stream in order to assist in its transportation from the field to
the consumer.”316 
If the pressure in the tubing is not sufficient to move the product to the
surface, it is necessary that the lessee introduce “compression” in order to
move the oil or gas up the annulus of the borehole. However, such costs
and expenses would constitute costs and expenses of production for which
the lessee would be solely responsible.
If, on the other hand, the product reaches the surface as a consequence
of the well’s natural or unenhanced pressure, but needs compression in
order to move the gas to market, that would constitute a “post-production
cost,” eligible for assessment on a proportionate basis to the lessor.
InMerritt v. Southwestern Electric Power Co.,317 the lessors sued their
lessee to dissolve a mineral lease because the lessee charged the royalty
owners with a proportionate part of compression charges. The parties
315. Id. at *10, ¶ ¶ 39–40 (emphasis in original).
316. Jeffrey C. King, The Compression of Natural Gas: It is Production or
Post-Production? Is it Deductible from Royalties? If so, How Much?, 1 TEX. J.
OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 36 (2006).
317. 499 So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
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732019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
entered into a stipulation of facts, and that was the only evidence presented
to the court. 
The court observed that the “sole issue” was “whether the charges for
compression of gas (to raise the flow pressure of the gas above that of the
pipeline) are properly deductible from the plaintiffs’ royalty payments
which are to be based only on market value at the well.”318 
The parties’ stipulation established that compression was necessary in
order “to maintain a flow pressure sufficient to flow gas from the gathering
system into the . . . pipeline.”319 
The court stated that, in order to determine whether the royalty owners
must bear a portion of the compression charges, “the lease must first be
examined to ascertain the point at which the royalty clause fixes the price
of the gas.”320 The “Royalty Clause” in the controlling agreement fixed the
royalty on the basis of “market value at the well.”321 
The court then observed that “Louisiana jurisprudence has applied a
reconstruction approach to determine market value.”322 “Under this
approach, market value is reconstructed by beginning with the gross
proceeds from the sale of the gas and deducting therefrom any additional
costs of taking the gas from the wellhead (the point of production) to the
point of sale.”323 
The court then explained the proper inquiry to be made is as follows:
. . . [I]f compression charges are necessary in order for the well to
produce, i.e. for the gas to reach the wellhead, then such charges
are not deductible from royalty payments. If, on the other hand, 
the compression charges are necessary only to push the gas from
the producing well into the pipeline, then this cost is a post-
production or marketing cost and is therefore deductible from
royalty payments.324 
The court determined that “the compression costs at issue were post-
production costs and as such were properly deductible from [the lessors’]
royalty payments under this particular Louisiana lease form.”325 
318. Id. at 212.
319. Id. at 211.
320. Id. at 213.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 215.
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VI. DEDUCTIBILITY OF “POST-PRODUCTION COSTS”326 
As previously observed, there is rarely any controversy or dispute
arising out of the marketing of oil, due to the stable market for that liquid
product; the generally consistent pricing of liquid products; the lack of any
significant need for infrastructure as in the case of gas production, and the
ability to immediately transport the oil. Additionally, a contract for the sale
of oil is usually terminable on short notice, often sixty or ninety days.
In contrast, a variety of issues are presented with respect to gas
production. While some of the issues arising out of the production of
natural gas are common to the issues necessitating the “Shut-in Clause,”327 
other issues are uniquely presented in connection with the need to process,
treat or transport the gas production after the point of production. Also,
gas sales contracts—in contrast to oil sales contracts—tend to be of longer
terms, because of the capital-intensive nature of gas marketing.
A. Methodology to Determine Market Value “At the Well”
In the situation in which royalty attaches “at the well,” or “at the mouth
of the well,” and if subsequent treatment or processing is necessitated in
order to market the gas, or other remedial or contractual circumstances are
involved, giving rise to expenditures by the operator to market the product
at or after the wellhead, these functions or processes cost money.
Ultimately, at a point further downstream from the “mouth of the well,”
some party purchases the processed, marketable gas from the lessee for a 
price that is greater in value than would have been paid for the “raw gas
stream,” in the unprocessed condition in which it existed at the “mouth of
the well.”
Because the royalty interest of the lessor had already attached “at the
mouth of the well,”328 it is necessary to discern and allocate the costs
incurred in the post-extraction steps that rendered the gas marketable,
thereby enhancing its marketability and, concomitantly, its value. As seen
previously, the question presented is whether the lessee alone is chargeable
326. See William E. Rogers, Royalties on Processed Gas, 14 ANN. INST. ON 
MIN. LAW 29 (1967); Frederick R. Parker, Jr., Costs Deductible by the Lessee in
Accounting to Royalty Owners for Production of Oil or Gas, 46 LA. L. REV. 895 
(1986); Edward B. Poitevent, II, & Christopher L. Hewitt, Post-Production
Deductions from Royalty, 46 ANN. INST. ON MIN. LAW 65 (1999); Owen L.
Anderson, Calculating Royalty: “Costs” Subsequent To Production--“Figures 
Don’t Lie, But . . . .”, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 591 (1994).
327. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-13.
328. See supra Part I.C.
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752019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
with these costs and expenses, or does the lessor bear any responsibility
for any portion of such costs and expenses? If so, how are these determined
if there is no market “at the well”?
B. The “Reconstruction Method”
“Louisiana jurisprudence has applied a reconstruction approach to 
determine market value. Under this approach, market value is
reconstructed by beginning with the gross proceeds from the sale of the
gas and deducting therefrom any additional costs of taking the gas from
the wellhead (the point of production) to the point of sale.”329 
This method is not external to the mineral lease; rather, it is the
interpretive technique employed by the court in order to give effect to the
parties’ agreement that royalty is to be based on market value “at the well.”
Indeed, the protocol followed by the courts of Louisiana was characterized
by one early court as “nothing but common sense and simple justice.”330 
The “reconstruction method” is also called the “work-back” or “net
back” valuation method and has been defined by the preeminent
commentators on oil and gas law, as follows:
A method for calculating market value of oil or gas at the wellhead
when value cannot be calculated on the basis of comparable sales.
Under this method, costs of transportation, processing, and
treatment are deducted from the ultimate proceeds of sale of the
oil or gas and any extracted or processed products to ascertain
wellhead value.331 
A federal district court in Oklahoma explained the method, stating:
Effective application of this method requires selection of an
appropriate starting value in the form of a processing stage whose
product possesses a value certain; accurate assessment of the costs
accruing between the known stage and the one in question is also
essential. In developing a resource from a raw material into a
finished product, each production stage will add economic value
to what was initially only the value of the raw material. The value
added at each stage of production is essentially the cost of
resources used in taking the material through that stage of
329. Merritt v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210, 213 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1986).
330. Hemler v. Union Prod. Co., 40 F. Supp. 824, 832 (D.C. La. 1941).
331. 8 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS:
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (2015).
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76 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
production. The work-back method essentially establishes at each
production stage the value of the product at that point. By 
subtracting out all production costs, the value of the raw material
is revealed. Application of this approach, however, can be
difficult. Market structures vary at different production stages and
correlating figures from one stage to the next can require abstruse
analytical calculations, easily resulting in error. The selected
starting point should be as close as possible to the production stage 
in question.332 
In the important case Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co.,333 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court embraced the “net back” to the wellhead
approach in determining royalties on gas sold at a point downstream of the
wellhead.
The “reconstruction method” was explained in Freeland v. Sun Oil
Co.334 with the Fifth Circuit explaining the methodology, as follows:
In determining the market value of such gas at the well where there
is no established criteria of a market, the Louisiana approach, which
is binding on us, is to consider the end product of the extraction
process as a factor. But it is a factor in reconstructing a market value
at a place where in fact there was no, or little, market and
consequently an appropriate deduction must be made.335 
The Freeland court reviewed prior decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court on this topic (rendered between 1932 and 1933) and
summarized those cases, prior to reaching its ultimate conclusion.
The first case examined in Freeland was Coyle v. Louisiana Gas &
Fuel Co.336 The court’s examination disclosed that, after first holding that
the lessor was entitled to royalty on 100% of the products of the extraction
plant, the Coyle Court, on rehearing, held that the royalty should be
computed on the basis of that portion of the end products that were
returned by the processor under the processing contract. The court
expressed the view that, where large expenditures make a valueless 
commodity one of great value, the contract would be harsh, unless the
332. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 463 F. Supp. 619, 620–21 
(D.C. Okla. 1978).
333. 152 So. 561, 563 (La. 1934).
334. 277 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.), cert. den’d 364 U.S. 826 (1960).
335. Id. at 157.
336. 144 So. 737 (La. 1932).
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772019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
costs were shared. Consequently, it was proper that the contract should be
construed, if possible, to avoid that result.337 
The Coyle Court then declared “the law would step in, as a part of the
contract, and say whether the royalty should be delivered free of cost.”338 
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Coyle said, “[this,] we think the law has
done by providing, in effect, that the cost of extraction, incurred by the
lessee, to preserve the gas and its gasoline content, by making both 
merchantable, should be deducted before computing and delivering the
lessor’s royalty.”339 
Of “decisive importance” to the Freeland court was the case of Wall
v. United Gas Public Service Co.340 With respect to gas utilized or sold off
the premises, the mineral lease at issue provided that the lessor “shall be
paid one-eighth (1/8) of the value of such gas calculated at the market price
per thousand [cubic] feet.”341 
The lessee sold the gas to a pipeline at a point two miles from the well
at 5.8 cents per mcf. It extracted gasoline that it sold at the market price.
The lessee paid royalty based on 4 cents per mcf for the gas sold, and on
the gasoline extracted at the market price, less costs of extraction.342 
The lessor claimed royalties on the gas at the price for which it was
sold (5.8 cents per mcf), and on gasoline without deduction for cost of
extraction. After emphasizing that, in Coyle and Crichton, the “gas was so
heavily impregnated with gasoline that it was worthless in its original
state,”343 the Wall Court makes it clear that the absence of such a factor
does not result in a different rule of law. The Court stated:
The facts in (the Coyle) case are different from those in this case,
but the principle involved is the same in this, that the lessee cannot
be taxed with the whole cost of marketing the gas and extracting
therefrom the gasoline.344 
The Court again demonstrated that the Louisiana approach is one of
“reconstructing” a “market value.” As to the gas sold at a remote point (at
5.8 cents per mcf), the trial court allowed the lessor royalty on the basis of
that price less the reasonable expense of transporting the gas from the
337. Id. at 742.
338. Id. at 743.
339. Id.
340. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934).
341. Id. at 562.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 564.
344. Id.
337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd  82 1/3/20  7:23 AM
     
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
   
   
   
  
  
   
    
  
   
    
  
  
 
    
    
 
   
  
      
 
  
  
  
  
   
 
  
 
   
 
 
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
78 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
wellhead to the point of sale. This produced a “market price” somewhat
less than 5.8 cents per mcf, but somewhat more than 4 cents per mcf as
paid by the lessee. 
While first recognizing that this process of “reconstruction” was
proper, the court stated that its ruling “would unquestionably be correct if
as a matter of fact the gas had no ‘market value’ in the field. But we find 
as a fact that it did.”345 
The court analyzed the evidence and declared that there was a market
at 4 cents per mcf, and since that was the “market price” in the field, it had
to be accepted as the basis of settlement in the case.346 
The court in the plainest of language reaffirmed its earlier
determination that a “lessor should bear his proportion of the expense of
saving the gasoline and of rendering the gas valuable . . . .”347 It held that,
under mineral leases of the type involved, the lessor is “liable for cost of
extracting gasoline from gas in proportion to amount received by
lessor.”348 
Finally, these principles were applied in Tyson v. Surf Oil Co.,349 in 
which the Court points out that there was “no direct evidence in the record
to prove the market price of gas” in the particular field.350 The gas was
“wet gas.” Its “value,” the court stated, “is to be determined by considering
the value of the gas from the standpoint of fuel, plus the value of the
gasoline content.”351 
The Court in Tyson engaged in a detailed mathematical process of
making the separate determination of the two components (liquid
hydrocarbons and residue gas) to arrive, after adding the two of them
together, at the total “market value.” The calculations reflect a deduction
for the extraction or processing charge.
Giving due consideration to prior jurisprudence on the subject, the
Freeland court then commented on the “reconstruction method,” as
follows:
To put it another way: in the analytical process of reconstructing
a market value where none otherwise exists with sufficient
definiteness, all increase in the ultimate sales value attributable to
the expenses incurred in transporting and processing the
345. Id.
346. Id. at 565.
347. Id. at 564.
348. Id. 
349. 196 So. 336 (La. 1940).
350. Id. at 339.
351. Id.
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792019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
commodity must be deducted. The royalty owner shares only in
what is left over, whether stated in terms of cash or an end product.
In this sense he bears his proportionate part of that cost, but not
because the obligation (or expense) of production rests on him.
Rather, it is because that is the way in which Louisiana law arrives 
at the value of the gas at the moment it seeks to escape from the
wellhead.352 
C. Touchstones for Deductibility
Even in a case where legal or contractual authority exists for the
attribution to the lessor of its royalty share of a particular “post-production 
cost,” a court could nevertheless scrutinize such cost to ascertain that it
was actually incurred, necessary, and reasonable in amount.
Authority for the observations made above could be found in the
general principles of article 122 of the Mineral Code, which instructs that
while “mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor,” “he
is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to develop and operate
the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit
of himself and his lessor.”353 This pervasive, rather amorphous standard of
conduct certainly encompasses a duty on the part of the lessee to act in a
reasonable and equitable manner toward its lessor.
1. Expenses Actually Incurred at or After the Wellhead
Aside from the temporal aspect of when (in a functional sense) the
expense was incurred (i.e., “pre-” or “post-” wellhead), the expense must
also exist in the sense that it was actually incurred by the operator. An
“expense” that might be anticipated but was never incurred is self-
evidently not an expenditure as to which the operator should be entitled to
be reimbursed. 
The case of Babin v. First Energy Corp.,354 supports the proposition 
that, even when the lessee may properly charge the lessor’s royalty share
with a proportionate part of “post-production costs,” such costs cannot
exceed the actual amount incurred.
352. 277 F.2d at 159 (emphasis added).
353. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122.
354. 693 So. 2d 813 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997). See OTTINGER, MINERAL
LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(6)(viii)(F).
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2. Necessity of Activity Giving Rise to the Expense
The fact that a lessor (or other interest owner) might be responsible to
share in “post-production costs” is in no sense a license for the operator to 
expend money without limitation or an opportunity for scrutiny. The cost
incurred by the operator should be limited to those expenses as are
necessary in the sense that they must be incurred in order to market the
production.
As one Louisiana court has recognized, “[t]he presence of gas at the
wellhead is of no value until it is marketed and transported to the 
purchaser . . . . [P]roduction is futile without distribution of the product.”355 
“In determining market value[,] costs which are essential to make a
commodity worth anything or worth more must be borne proportionately
by those who benefit.”356 
3. Reasonableness of Expense Incurred
Just as the expense for which reimbursement (by way of deduction) is
sought must have been necessarily incurred, the amount must be
reasonable. It is not asking too much for the operator to make prudent
decisions as to the reasonableness of any expenditure of monies in order
to market the production.
The reasonableness of an authorized cost would be determined by
examining similar costs as charged or incurred by other operators, in a 
similar circumstance, both geographically and in terms of the nature of the
operation or physical configuration of the field and marketing facilities.
Although, for reasons noted previously,357 it is not suggested that it is
controlling, the Louisiana Conservation Act recognizes that the
expenditures of the unit operator must not exceed prevailing rates.
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:10(A)(2)(b) provides that non-
operating owners should be responsible for their allocated share of “actual
reasonable expenditures” related to the well.358 
It is customary and virtually universal that the COPAS Accounting
Procedure is attached to the operating agreement.359 However, it is
355. Culpepper v. EOG Res., Inc., 92 So. 3d 1141, 1444 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.),
98 So. 3d 870 (La. 2012).
356. Freeland v. Sun Oil Co., 277 F.2d 154, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. den’d 364 
U.S. 826 (1960).
357. See Part III.B.3 hereof.
358. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:10(A)(2)(b).
359. “The other agreement was an ‘Operating Agreement,’ which attached an
accounting procedure referred to by the parties as ‘COPAS,’ the acronym for the
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812019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
generally recognized that the form of Accounting Procedure governs costs,
not revenues, and, hence, “post-production costs” (to the extent that they
are effectuated by a deduction against revenue) are not covered thereby.
Rather, accounting for costs of this type are addressed in Accounting
Guideline 15 (Gas Accounting Manual) promulgated by COPAS.360 
Among other things, this AG-15 contains the following statement of
general pertinence with respect to this standard of reasonableness, to-wit:
Where deductions are permitted, care should be taken to ensure
that the amounts deducted are fair and commensurate with the
services provided. If costs developed in the normal manner appear
to be unusually high, they should be referred to the proper person
in the company for a decision about whether the actual costs
should be used or whether an estimated lower rate should be
substituted for actual costs.361 
4. Enhancement of Production or Value
The issue has been raised as to whether the operator must demonstrate
that the process for which it seeks contribution, actually “enhanced”
production. 
The Freeland court made the following observation that negates any
suggestion that a cost is only deductible if it enhances production (or the
value of production), stating:
The principle is much more pervading than the lessors would
recognize. It is not, as they claim, limited to the extraction cost
necessary to make an absolutely worthless thing (gas) into
something of value. It stands for the proposition that in 
Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies.” Mack Energy Co. v. Expert Oil &
Gas, L.L.C., 159 So. 3d 437, 439 (La. 2015). “The Council of Petroleum
Accountants Societies (COPAS), a national organization since 1961, has issued a 
succession of accounting forms which serve as the primary source of oil and gas
accounting standards in the industry.” Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley
Oil & Gas Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 412, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
360. COPAS is an acronym for Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies.
See id.
361. Accounting Guideline 15 (Gas Accounting Manual) (April 2010). This 
Accounting Guideline was accepted by an appellate court as “additional guidance
as to industry standards on gas accounting.” Red Willow Offshore, LLC v. Palm
Energy Offshore LLC, 185 So. 3d 293, 300 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2016). The
author expresses appreciation to the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies 
(COPAS) for permission to utilize these copyrighted materials in this publication.
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determining market value costs which are essential to make a
commodity worth anything or worth more must be borne
proportionately by those who benefit.362 
In a case out of Colorado, in which the lessors challenged the manner
in which the lessee calculated royalty under the mineral lease, the court
concluded that prior jurisprudence requires only that transportation costs
be reasonable, but did not require “that transportation costs incurred after
the first commercial market enhance the value of the gas or increase
royalty revenues in order to be deducted from royalty payments.”363 The
decision indicates that the courts in Colorado do apply a requirement of
enhancement to the deductibility of certain “post-production costs,” but
this court declined to extend that requirement to transportation costs.? 
A federal district court in Louisiana found an issue of material fact,
precluding summary judgment, as to whether the PPCs at issue resulted in
an enhancement of “the value of the product being sold and the price 
obtained for such product or are required to make the product
marketable.”364 However, the enhancement requirement was imposed 
contractually, not by general law.
If “enhancement” were an intrinsic requirement for deductibility, there
would have been no need to examine the contract for its relevance. Beyond
the other requisites noted above, the process or treatment need not
necessarily “enhance” production, or the value thereof, in order to be
eligible for deductibility.
5. Profit on Top of Actual Costs
In Babin v. First Energy Corp.,365 at issue was the propriety of
assessing against the lessors’ royalty share, an amount of processing costs
in excess of those actually incurred by the lessee. The Louisiana First
Circuit framed the question, as follows:
[I]f actual gas processing costs to make the extracted gas
marketable ranged from $.08 to $.17 per MMBTU, was it proper
for Lessees to charge Owners $.20 or $.25, on the grounds that
non-royalty owners were charged as much as $.35 to $.60 for use
of the Irene Central Facility (ICF) that Lessees caused to be
362. 277 F.2d at 313 (emphasis added).
363. Lindauer v. Williams Production RMT Co., 381 P.3d 378 (Colo. App. 2016).
364. Dickson v. Sklarco, LLC, No. 5:11-cv-00352, 2013 WL 1828051 (W.D.
La. 2013).
365. 693 So. 2d 813 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
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832019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
constructed at a cost of $9.7 Million?366 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lessee but the
court of appeal observed that “[n]either the trial court nor Lessees cite any
convincing authority to support a deduction from royalties for fair market
value of the processing, which in acceptable cost accounting terms is a
charge for profit. The consensus of authority in Louisiana appears to allow
lessees to deduct for reasonable costs, but not additional amounts for
profit.”367 
Thus, the court reversed the trial court, finding that it “erred in
granting summary judgment on the claim for processing costs
deductions.”368 Seemingly, the summary judgment was reversed not
because of the existence of any material fact, but because the lessee was
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Thus, Babin (albeit a decision which merely reversed a motion for
summary judgment that had been granted by the trial court in favor of the
lessee) supports the proposition that, even when the lessee may properly
charge the lessor’s royalty share with a proportionate part of “post-
production costs,” such costs cannot exceed the actual, reasonable costs
incurred.369 It would generally be an insupportable position to create a
“profit center” within the context of the lessor-lessee relationship.
6. Equitable Allocation of Common Expenses
Any necessary treating or processing may occur on the lease, but more
frequently it might be accomplished off of the leased premises, at a central
facility in the field. This facility typically services numerous leases, wells 
or units. In such event, it is necessary to allocate the costs incurred at the
point of treatment or processing, on a reasonable and equitable basis, to
the lease or well giving rise to the gas production that is processed through
the central facility. 
366. 693 So. 2d at 814–15.
367. Id. at 816.
368. Id.
369. Purely by way of analogy, this view is concordant with LA. REV. STAT.
§ 30:111 which provides that “[o]wners of unleased mineral interests and lessees
in any drilling unit authorized by the department of conservation of this state, shall 
not be liable or obligated to pay to the operator or producer for materials furnished
or used in the drilling, completion, and production of any oil, gas, or mineral well 
drilled on said unit a sum in excess of the prevailing market price of such
materials.” (emphasis added).
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84 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
The Accounting Guideline 15 (Gas Accounting Manual) discussed
earlier370 says the following in this regard:
Central facilities are installations that serve two or more leases,
thus eliminating the need for separate installations on each lease.
The most common types are compressor and/or dehydration
stations, CO2/H2S removal facilities, and gathering systems.
Because a central facility is in effect providing post-production
services to the leases served, the facility costs are properly charged
to the leases served and may be considered to be post-production
expenses of the leases for recording, royalty, and tax purposes. 
Facility costs should be allocated to each lease served on a basis
that reflects the benefits derived by the lease from the facility
operations. For example, costs of a gas gathering system might be
allocated on the basis of volumes received into the system for each
lease or the number of wells served for each lease. Costs of a
compressor station may be allocated on the basis of volumes
compressed that are attributable to each lease.
Facility costs would include all expenses directly incurred in the
operation and maintenance of the facility, such as labor, supplies, 
and utilities. Depreciation on the facility investment and a fair rate
of return on the investment normally would be properly added to
the direct costs for royalty and tax purposes, lease provisions and
state tax regulations permitting; however, whether they should be
included for financial book recordings would depend on the
individual producer’s accounting practices. Many companies
include an allocated amount of administrative overhead as part of
their facility costs.
An operator’s formula for the equitable allocation of processing costs back
to the lease that generated the gas being processed at a common facility
was approved by the Fifth Circuit in Piney Woods Country Life School v.
Shell Oil Co.371 The court explained the operator’s allocation protocol, as 
follows:
The cost of gas processing and sulphur recovery at the Thomasville
Field, together with costs of gathering and transporting, are 
370. See supra Part VI.C.3.
371. 905 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1990). This decision was rendered in continuing
litigation following the decision in Piney Woods, supra note 32.
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852019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
deducted by Shell in calculating payments to royalty interest
owners for their respective interests in the subject gas. Similar
charges are deducted pro rata from the working interest owners’
shares of production. To compute these payments, Shell devised an 
allocation and accounting procedure which insures (sic) that each
well is properly credited for its share of the production while
reimbursing the plant for costs associated with processing the gas. 
This latter function is accomplished by equations which compute a
“plant-lease split” of the residue gas and sulphur revenues.372 
The court’s approval of the methodology employed by Shell in the Piney
Woods case demonstrates that the court will scrutinize the accounting
protocols for fairness and reasonableness.
VII. ALTERATION OF DEFAULT RULE UNDER AN “AT THE WELL” LEASE
A. “Freedom of Contract”
In general, under Louisiana law, and certainly within the body of law 
pertinent to mineral leases, parties are free to construct their own
agreements and bargains which will enjoy full approbation and
enforcement by the courts, subject only to certain limitations on
contractual license which are grounded in public policy. The courts fully
embrace this principle of “freedom of contract.”373 
Thus, it is said that the “policy of the law is that all men of lawful age
and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting,
and their contracts, when freely and voluntarily made, are not lightly to be
interfered with by the courts. Hence the contract . . . submitted for
interpretation must be held sacred and be judicially enforced, unless the
intent of the parties is wholly unascertainable or is clearly unlawful.”374 
B. “No Deductions Clause”375 
1. A Lessor May Avail its Rights Under “Freedom of Contract”
A lessor desiring to avoid responsibility for “post-production costs”
might seek to include a “No Deductions Clause” in its mineral lease. This
372. Id. at 855.
373. The important principle of “freedom of contract” is addressed in Part I of
Chapter Two of OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE.
374. Salles v. Stafford, Derbes & Roy, 137 So. 62, 63 (La. 1931).
375. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 5-14.
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clause is also referred to as a “No Cost Clause,” or a “No Deducts Clause,”
or a “Cost Free Clause.”376 
Such clauses are enforced in Louisiana, although they necessitate an
analysis of their import, construction and supremacy over the default rule
stated above.
The addition of a “No Deductions Clause” to a printed form of lease
invokes the rule of interpretation that, in the case of conflict between the
printed form and any typewritten language, the latter controls.377 
Recognizing the role of “freedom of contract” to alter the default rule,
the court in Merritt v. Southwestern Electric Power Co.378 stated, as
follows: “Unless the parties agree otherwise, the cost of marketing gas
once it has been produced is shared by the lessor and lessee under a
market-value lease.”379 
For example, at issue in Columbine II Limited Partnership v. Energen
Resources Corp.,380 was the right of the sublessee under a sublease
agreement to deduct certain transportation costs from the sublessor’s share
of production. The sublease differed from the underlying mineral lease in
that the former contained a clause disallowing the assessment of “post-
production costs.”
The trial court “held that Columbine’s deductions were impermissible
on the basis that the language contained within the sublease agreement,
which created the overriding royalty, plainly stated that Columbine’s
royalty interest was to be free of all additional costs, including
transportation costs.”381 
On appeal, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,
embracing the parties’ rights under the doctrine of “freedom of contract,”
as follows:
376. Three examples of a “No Deductions Clause” are set forth in OTTINGER,
MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 5-14(b).
377. See OTTINGER,MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 2-04(c). But
see Clovelly Oil Co. LLC v. Midstates Petroleum Co. LLC, 112 So. 3d 187, 193– 
94 (La. 2013) (“But, even where a contract contains both printed and handwritten
or typewritten terms, the contract must still be interpreted as a whole, and the
printed terms should be interpreted, if possible, so as to give them effect and to
harmonize them with the provisions that are handwritten or typewritten.”). In the
interest of full disclosure, your author represented certain amici curiae in this suit.
378. Merritt v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210, 213 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1986).
379. Id. at 214.
380. Columbine II Limited P’ship v. Energen Res. Corp., 129 Fed. Appx. 119
(5th Cir. 2005).
381. Id. at 121.
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872019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
Conversely, the parties also recognized that a separate clause in
the sublease agreement expressly provided that Energen was not
permitted to deduct fees for post-production costs associated with
transporting the gas to the commercial marketplace. Given that the
only express language on the subject in the sublease agreement
expressly precludes the deduction of post-production
transportation costs, we conclude that the district court did not err
in holding those costs not deductible.382 
As previously noted in Dickson v. Sklarco, LLC,383 was whether the
lessee could properly assess a portion of the costs of gathering the
production against the lessor’s royalty share of production. The court,
relying on “well-established jurisprudence,” determined “that
transportation and gathering costs are likely deductible from the lessors’
royalty under the standard provision contained in the Bath form of the
Leases.”384 However, the court ultimately concluded that a genuine issue 
of material fact existed, which precluded summary judgment with respect
to the meaning of a “No Deductions Clause.”385 
The “No Deductions Clause” in the lease addendum read, as follows:
The parties agree that post production costs may be deducted from
Lessor’s share of the proceeds from the sale of crude oil, natural
gas or other minerals payable as royalty under this Lease insofar
and only insofar as such costs either enhance the value of the
product being sold and the price obtained for such product or are
required to make the product marketable. Without limitation upon
the foregoing, the treating, processing or dehydrating of natural
gas to meet pipeline quality specifications shall be deemed to
enhance the value of the product being sold.386 
Invoking the ejusdem generis method of interpretation,387 the lessor
asserted that “the treatment example provided in [the “No Deductions
382. Id. at 122–23.
383. No. 5:11-CV-00352, 2013 WL 1828051 (W.D. La. 2013).
384. Id. at *6.
385. Id. 
386. Id. 
387. The ejusdem generis doctrine provides that, where general words follow
an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Principles of
Contractual Interpretation, 60 LA. L. REV. 765, 784 (2000).
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88 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
Clause”] was meant to limit potential costs applicable under the test set
out in the first sentence to similar examples, which would not include
gathering or transportation.”388 
The court did not embrace that argument, finding “the principle of
ejusdem generis to be inapplicable to Paragraph 8 because the sentence
begins with the phrase ‘without limitation upon the foregoing . . . .’”389 
As a general proposition, the “freedom of contract” doctrine operates
fully in respect of the issue of “post-production costs,” as there are no
issues of public policy that would deny the parties the ability to construct
their own bargain on this topic.390 Thus, as explained by one court,391 
“[u]nless the parties agree otherwise, the cost of marketing gas once it has
been produced is shared by the lessor and lessee under a market-value
lease.”392 
2. A Hybrid or Unique Situation in Connection with Unitized 
Operations and Production
The inclusion in a mineral lease of a “No Deductions Clause” does not
exculpate the leased tract from its responsibility for “post-production
costs.” The various costs to market, treat, or process the production from
the unit after it arrives at the wellhead are still incurred by the operator for
the indiscriminate benefit of all unit participants, and are to be
appropriately shared by the tract in question, regardless of whether the
mineral lease is silent on the deductibility of such costs, or expressly
disallows such deductibility. That would be a “funny thing” indeed if the
content of the mineral lease (with respect to which the unit operator is a
third person) would determine the ability vel non of such operator to assess
an allocated portion of such costs to this leased tract in the compulsory
unit.
The incorporation of a “No Deductions Clause” into a mineral lease
merely means that the lessee under such lease must bear the totality of such
attributed costs out of its own share of revenue, but may not pass along to
its lessor any portion of such costs by way of applying a deduction to the
revenue inuring to its royalty owner.
388. Dickson, 2013 WL 1828051, at *7.
389. Id.
390. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at Part 1, Ch. 2
(addressing the important principle of “freedom of contract.”).
391. Merritt v. Southwestern Elect. Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 1986).
392. Id. at 214.
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892019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
Notably, this scenario involves two different and distinct
relationships, being (1) the lessor-lessee relationship under an “at the well”
lease containing a “No Deductions Clause,” invoking the “reconstruction
method” to determine market value, but disallowing the deductibility of
“post-production costs” from the lessor’s royalty, and (2) the relationship
between the unit operator and a non-operator in which the latter is 
responsible for its allocated share of “post-production costs,” under the
premise of the law of unjust enrichment. 
Melding the two relationships together, the operator attributes a share
of “post-production costs” to the tract under lease to the non-operator, but
the lessee of that mineral lease assumes solely the burden of and
responsibility for those costs. The lessor bears no portion of those costs,
vis-à-vis its own lessee, by reason of the inclusion of the “No Deductions
Clause.”
These distinct relationships give rise to a hybrid or unique situation
(and, to the operator, often a cause of discomfort) if the non-operator
whose mineral lease disallows the lessee the right or ability to deduct
“post-production costs” from the royalty share of its lessor, did not elect
to participate in the cost, risk, and expense of the unit well. In such a
situation, the rights and obligations of both the operator and the non-
participating owner are evaluated under the Risk Fee Act.393 
The so-called Risk Fee Act was enacted in 1984 to provide a
mechanism whereby a party who does not affirmatively elect to participate
in the cost, risk, and expense of drilling a unit well will incur a “risk
charge” that must be paid out of production as a means of compensating
the “drilling owner” for assuming the cost, risk, and expense of that well.
Prior to the 2012 amendments to the Risk Fee Act, it was well-
established, in a long line of cases previously noted,394 that the operator
was entitled to retain all proceeds of production allocable to the non-
participating tract (whether that tract be leased or unleased), plus
(assuming proper compliance with the Risk Fee Act) a “risk charge” until
393. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:10(A)(2)(a)-(h). See Ottinger, supra note 49.
394. See supra Part III.B.1.
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90 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
the well in question achieved “pay-out.”395 This includes the share of unit
production otherwise allocable to the royalty owner.396 
However, due to controversial amendments made to the Risk Fee Act
in 2012,397 the operator now has the duty and obligation to pay to the non-
participating lessee, “for the benefit of his lessor royalty owner,” the
royalty to which the lessor is entitled under its mineral lease.398 
The ability of the operator to discharge this new duty is often
challenging since, in many instances, the operator has not examined title
to the unitized tract of land in which it owns no leasehold interest. While
the operator might be able to obtain, from the public records, a copy of the
mineral lease covering this non-participating tract, still, short of expending
the money to examine title to such land, there is no basis to ensure that the
party purporting to be the lessor of such tract in fact owns the executive
interest in the land, and is the proper person to whom royalties are due.
Moreover, it is not infrequent that the mineral lease itself is not filed
for registry, but, rather, that a notice (sometimes called a “declaration,”
“memorandum” or “extract”) of lease is instead filed for record.399 In that
instance, there is no statutory requirement that the filed notice must
contain unique provisions in the mineral lease, such as a “No Deductions
Clause,” if any there be. Thus, on the face of the filed notice, the operator
has no knowledge of whether “post-production costs” may, or may not, be
deducted by the lessee.
395. The “risk charge” under the Louisiana Risk Fee Act is somewhat
comparable to the non-consent recoupment factor (sometimes called a “non-
consent penalty”) under the subsequent operations provision of the model form
operating agreement. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Be Careful What You Ask For:
Subsequent Operations Under the Model Form Operating Agreement, in Center
for American and International Law, Sixty-third Annual Institute on Oil and Gas
Law, Ch. 7 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2012).
396. See Gulf Explorer, LLC v. Clayton Williams Energy, Inc., 964 So. 2d
1042 (La. App. Ct. 1st 2007) (“Clayton Williams has no contractual relationship
with Gulf’s lessors; under the facts presented herein, Clayton Williams has no
obligation to pay Gulf’s royalty and overriding royalty owners before it legally
recoups its expenses from production pursuant to LSA-R.S. 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i).”).
Id. at 1045. Note that this case is no longer a valid statement of law after the 2012
amendments to the Risk Fee Act.
397. Act No. 743, 2012 La. Acts 3030.
398. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:10(A)(2)(b)(ii)(aa).
399. Id. § 9:2742.
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912019] A FUNNY THING HAPPENED AT THE WELLHEAD
These are but a few illustrations of the issues with which the operator
is confronted, while at the same time, having a new responsibility to pay
royalties over to the non-participating lessee for the benefit of its lessor.400 
Be that as it may, if it becomes satisfied that the lessor is the proper
party to whom royalty is due, and that the mineral lease contains a “No
Deductions Clause,” the operator who undertakes to discharge its new
(post-2012) obligation to pay such royalties on behalf of the lessee who
has not participated in the cost, risk, and expense of drilling the unit well,
will pay royalties in respect of such lessor in an amount that does not
deduct the otherwise allocable share of “post-production costs.”
Yet, those necessary costs have been incurred by the operator with
respect to the entirety (8/8ths) of unit production,401 including the share
allocable to the production generated from or attributable to the tract of
land in question. Ultimately, the lessee of such non-participating tract
would be solely responsible for all “post-production costs” attributable to
its tract and lease, but these are only recovered by the operator out of
production, and then, only to the extent that production is sufficient to
“pay-out” such amount, conceivably including the applicable risk charge
pertinent thereto.
C. A Brief Comment About Treatment of These Issues under Law of
Texas
In Texas, lessors have had considerably less success than their cousins
in the Bayou State in altering the default rule under an “at the well” lease.
Most notably, in Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank,402 the “Royalty 
Clause” of the lease provided that “the market value at the well of 1/5 of
the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the well the royalty
shall be 1/5 of the amount realized from such sale provided, however, that
there shall be no deductions from the value of the Lessor's royalty by
reason of any required processing, cost of dehydration, compression,
transportation or other matter to market such gas.”403 
400. These and a myriad of other issues arising out of the 2012 amendments
to the Risk Fee Act are under study by the Louisiana State Law Institute. The
author of this Article is serving as the Reporter for the Risk Fee Act Committee 
of the Louisiana State Law Institute, tasked with evaluating the legislation
(particularly the 2012 amendments), and making legislative recommendations in
connection therewith.
401. In the oil and gas industry, the fraction—8/8ths—is used to denominate
100% of the production obtained from a well, including the lessor’s share.
402. 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996).
403. Id. at 121.
337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd  96 1/3/20  7:23 AM
     
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
    
    
 
 
    
  
 
   
    
    
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
    
     
 
   
   
     
  
   
 
  
 
 
  
  
   
  
92 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
The lessor, NationsBank, sued its lessee, Heritage, to challenge the
propriety of the lessee’s deduction from the lessor’s royalty share, of a
proportionate part of costs incurred to transport gas from the wellhead to
a point of sale, contending that such deductions were disallowed by the
express language of the mineral lease.404 
The trial court and the appellate court sided with the lessor, finding
that the deductions for a portion of transportation costs were not permitted
by the “No Deductions Clause” contained in the mineral lease. 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the commonly 
accepted meaning of the ‘royalty’ and ‘market value at the well’ terms
renders the post-production clause in each lease surplusage as a matter of
law.”405 
It is the experience of your author that many operators based in Texas,
but operating in Louisiana, are surprised that the “default” rule of Heritage
does not prevail in Louisiana, in that it has not yet been adopted or
embraced by any court sitting in Louisiana or applying Louisiana law.
However, so robust is the doctrine of “freedom of contract” in
Louisiana,406 there is no reason of public policy that would operate so as
to preclude the contracting parties from altering, by appropriate modifying
language, an “at the well” lease so as to achieve the same result as reached
in Heritage.407 
CONCLUSION
Iron and steel, gaskets and valves, pipes and gauges, nuts and bolts, 
bells and whistles—this is the device where all of our “funny” things
occur. The title to this Article held out the hope of some humor, but it
probably falls a bit short in that area. Hopefully, the reader will at least
404. Id. 
405. Id. at 123.
406. OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at Chapter 2, Part 1
(addressing the important principle of “freedom of contract”).
407. In two very significant oil and gas cases, the Supreme Court has noted
that parties to a mineral lease may bargain as they see fit and will receive the 
approbation of the courts with respect to the enforcement of their contract. See,
e.g., Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 694 (La. 2003) (“We first note that
the language of the contract itself does not limit Shell’s liability for reasonable
restoration to the market value of the property. If Shell wanted such a limitation,
it could have bargained for such; it did not do so.”). The Court has also recognized
the “respect for the rights of contracting parties,” and “respect for the terms of the
mineral lease to which the parties agreed.” Terrebonne Parish School Board v.
Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 792 (La. 2005).
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agree with the observation that “there’s a lot going on at the wellhead,”
even if not “funny things.”
The topic of “post-production costs” is both complex and
comprehensive, and entails significant issues of accounting, marketing,
engineering, and law.
With the significant presence of unconventional drilling activity in
Louisiana and elsewhere, it is true—even if not “funny”—that these issues
will continue for the foreseeable future.
Case by case, clarity is brought to this topic where none existed before.
Even in Louisiana, the Haynesville Shale has given rise to controversies
in a variety of relationships—leased or unleased, royalty or working
interest, and even unleased minerals.
It is hoped that this Article has given insight into how these issues
have historically been handled or should be resolved in the future as cases
make their way through our courts.
A postscript on a yet to be resolved case. As noted previously,408 at the
date of publication of this Article, the case of Johnson v. Chesapeake
Louisiana, L.P., remains pending before the trial court, with the court
having under advisement defendant’s motion to reconsider its ruling that
“post-production costs cannot be recovered by an operator from an
unleased mineral owner’s share of production proceeds.”409 At issue is the
nature of the relationship between an operator of a compulsory unit and an
unleased mineral owner in such unit. The right of the operator to assess
“post-production costs” against the revenue to which the UMO is entitled,
it has been argued, can be validated on the basis of the operator, as the
party who markets production on behalf of the UMO, being a mandatary410 
or a negotiorum gestor,411 as has been held in other cases. This case bears
continued scrutiny.
408. No. 5:16-CV-1543, 2019 WL 1301985 (W.D. La. Mar. 21, 2019). As
previously noted, the author represents the defendant in this suit.
409. Id. at *5.
410. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989. See also Dixon v. Am. Liberty Oil Co., 77 So.
2d 533, 539 (La. 1954) (“[I]n view of the orders of the Conservation Commission,
defendant-lessees are extracting the oil as plaintiffs’ agents pro hoc vice and must 
account to them for it[.]”).
411. Taylor v. David New Operating Co., Inc., 619 So. 2d 1251, 1255 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir.), writ den’d, 625 So. 2d 1046 (La. 1993) (“[Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 30:10(A)(3)] gives the owner a cause of action in quasi-contract
under LSA-C.C. art. 2292, et seq., insofar as the operator, in selling the owner’s
proportionate share of the oil produced, is acting as a negotiorum gestor or
manager of the owner’s business in selling the oil produced.”).
